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structures, many of which were located
downtown commercial areas. There was

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

however, other methodical and
efforts
can also pursue less costly approaches. The state
and local governments, the private sector, and
citizens can take many prudent and economical
measures to reduce future losses and facilitate
recovery.
In addition, the Commission suggests that
the state spend or authorize money for building
rehabilitation only if assured that the resulting
projects will identify earthquake hazards and
mitigate them to the extent practicable.
Another consideration behind the primary
recommendations is recent estimates of the
likelihood of a major earthquake. The
Commission accepts the validity of scientific
forecasts showing a 90 percent chance of a large
earthquake striking a major California urban
center at some time in the next 30 years. Such
an event in either southern or northern
California would cause 10 to 20 times as much
damage, loss, and social disruption as that
resulting from the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
Consequently, the Commission recommends
State and local decisions take this likelihood
into account when setting program priorities
and allocating resources. Public information and
response capacity building efforts should be
stepped up. Local and regional emergency
planning should be expanded and exercises
should be held more frequently. Resources
allocated for hazard reduction should be
redirected to regions known to have high nearterm risks of experiencing major earthquakes.
Finally, a third factor underlying the
Commission's recommendations is awareness
that future earthquake damage will not be
distributed randomly. Damage patterns are
generally
and are
correlated
with structures' age, the
and site geologic conditions. Combinations of
these
conditions can be found
:~n•<TWhP1rP in the
but

~~,"~~e.~,

densely housed and
in older buildings
and neighborhoods that are quite vulnerable to
failures and falling hazards. Many commuting
urban workers are also exposed to such lifethreatening hazards on a daily basis. This
indicates that the catastrophic potential that
already threatens Californians most at risk to
earthquake damage is increasing.
The three factors noted-tight fiscal
constraints, expected near-term large
earthquakes in urban areas, and the growing
numbers of people in particularly vulnerable
buildings and locales-prompted the
Commission to highlight cost-effective
recommendations emphasizing the areas known
to be most vulnerable to earthquakes.

Summary of Major
Recommendations
NEW CONSTRUCTION

The most cost-effective long-term protection
from the impacts of earthquakes is to ensure
that new construction is designed and built to
withstand seismic forces consistent with the
performance goals of the Commission's Risk
Policy (SSC 91-01). Current seismic codes and
design practices emphasize life safety. Owners
should be made aware that these minimum
standards are not intended to assure a building's
survival in a functional or even a repairable
condition after an earthquake. Some owners
already recognize this and make prudent
business decisions to assure higher level of
seismic
by
on higherthan-code minimum design and a thorough
awareness of the construction process. Other
owners should be encouraged to adapt this kind
of sensible and fiscally sound
for their
new construction.
Architects and
to

resistant
many others are more

owners to make definite decisions in
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cn.oosmi,R levels of seismic
that are
to the
intended long-term use of their structures. The
Commission's 1991 report Policy on Acceptable

structures are
state
or money.

Levels of Earthquake Risk in State Buildings

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

develops this policy in more detail. Furthermore
codes and performance standards are effective
if the designs are properly executed and are
enforced through quality assurance programs.
To be effective, the program should include
independent peer review of plans for all
important structures; checking of design
drawings, calculations, and specifications;
adequate construction inspection; and
observation of key construction details by
responsible design professionals. The
Commission is committed to continuing its
effort to secure wider acceptance of this
approach to decisions on new construction.

The Lorna Prieta earthquake's epicenter was
distant from the Bay Area's major population
centers, and governmental response to the
errterj~er:tci(~S caused by the earthquake was
generally adequate. In several cases, however,
available resources were stretched to capacity,
and a more destructive earthquake with an
urban epicenter on the Hayward fault or the
Peninsula segment of the San Andreas fault
would overwhelm the Bay Area's existing
emergency response capabilities. Improvements
are needed in personnel training and
equipment, particularly communications. The
adequacy of older underground water systems
should also be systematically evaluated. In
several locations, the earthquake destroyed
water systems, dramatically limiting firefighting
capabilities. The value of pre-earthquake
in the regular routine practice of
emergency response was often rated as the most
important contributor to good
in
responding to the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
Several more
recommendations are
noted below.

STATE SPENDING UMITA TIONS
The State should no longer aid in extending
the economic life of older and potentially
dangerous facilities unless the hazards are
in an appropriate, cost effective
manner. The Seismic
Commission
a
recommends that the State of California
policy discouraging use of state money or stateadministered funds to rehabilitate "'"'''"u"l>
structures unless ""JIJ'JH''-'
demonstrate that seismic hazard mitigation
The

Management. There is an
and improve
need to enhance,
California's current tmu~rgelrlCJ
The system should be
and :.rr·pntP£1

older structures. Where uv,"'"J''-·
involvement should include a
appropriate seismic retrofit of such older
structures when
are rehabilitated.
Consistent guidelines or standards
should be applied when older

emergency occurs.
Communications. The
and Lorna Prieta
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ini·Pr•·nr•tir.n of radio and teleonone
communication
A full and
comprehensive review of those
should be made. That review should lnrnn,,w,tP
knowledge about the role satellite communications can play in a major emergency. This
review should also evaluate the potential for
diminished effectiveness of cellular phone
systems when they are used simultaneously by
many who converge at the same general
location. The impact of piecemeal
implementation of the 800 Megahertz (800
MHz) communication systems on mutual aid
response capabilities should also be included.

" "1 u''""" could tip the balance
particularly if the
from inaction to
groundwork for further progress has been well
laid. Consequently the Commission and others
are obligated to continue informing owners
about the value of prompt action in taking
adequate precautions to reduce their future
earthquake losses.
A related concern is the absence of consensus
standards for nonductile concrete structures, to
guide hazard evaluation, cost estimation, and
retrofit practice. Lack of such standards is a
significant impediment to either encouraging or
requiring retrofit of such nonductile structures,
as well as other potentially hazardous types of
buildings. Accordingly development of
guidelines for nonductile concrete structures
and other potentially unsafe buildings is
another high-priority Commission
recommendation.

Mass Care And Shelter. Even a moderate
earthquake can rapidly overwhelm the ability of
local governmental and volunteer organizations
to provide immediate and long-term care and
shelter. Additional local organizations need to
be brought into the process of planning for and
providing emergency care and shelter. These
capacity building efforts should include
organizations representing the diversity of
citizens most at risk in each locale.

State Facilities. Governor Deukmejian's
Board of Inquiry on the collapse of the Cypress
Overpass recommended in its report, Competing
Against Time, that seismic safety be a priority
consideration for all state government facilities.
It urged the state to take the following steps to
achieve the goals of seismic safety and
maintenance of critical functions after
earthquakes:
" Complete programs of seismic retrofitting
of existing hazardous facilities
• Review and revise seismic safety standards
to meet these goals
• Require independent review of major
designs of facilities
• Conduct vigorous programs to enhance
VT\,Pr~i<P in earthquake
engineering and earthquake research
considerable progress and funding
have been realized in the State's Department of
Transportation, similar efforts have either not
been started or have lagged in nearly all other
state
(see the Commission's report on
Executive Order
number SSC 9006). These shc>rtc:orrlinJi/;S
addressed. The Commission and others must
work harder to enhance hazard reduction efforts

HAZARD REDUCTION IN EXISTING
STRUCTURES

Building damage by the Lorna Prieta earthquake confirmed the value of ongoing efforts to
improve the seismic resistance of existing
buildings and other structures. The Commission
should therefore continue to seek a high priority
for such efforts in California's seismic safety
program. As expected, building damage was
notably high in older unbraced
mobile
homes without
underpinnings, and unreinforced masonry (URM)
buildings. Although important progress is
made in confronting the URM building
California has not yet mustered the "'~'"U'~"·
resolve to
seismic
or
of older homes or of mobile homes. Nor has
California begun to deal with some other
significant hazardous building types
nonductile concrete). The state's next
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or otherwise we face the same lessons and
consequences after future earthquakes. The
Commission must also continue to review and
assess the adequacy of seismic hazard reduction
programs of all state agencies.

Model And Requirements For Community Recovery Planning. Recently the
Governor's Office of Emergency Services'
Southern California Earthquake Preparedness
Project (SCEPP), released an important
publication, Recovery and Reconstruction Planning
Guidelines for Local Governments. This
publication represents several years of work that
brought together a wide variety of
knowledgeable people, including community
officials from Whittier and Santa Cruz. The State
OES (including SCEPP, BAREPP and the Disaster
Assistance Division) should be funded to
undertake, along with selected local
governments, an experiment in implementing
the new guidelines. This would provide viable
planning models to guide other jurisdictions.
The Commission is committed to help OES
organize and obtain resources for such an
action-oriented demonstration effort.

The State of California should review the
geological siting and structural design of
seismidy suspect State-owned buildings and
privately owned buildings occupied by State
agencies. Where warranted, facilities should be
retrofitted or abandoned if necessary to protect
the public, state employees, and university
students, as well as the continuity of emergency
response and other essential services functions.
Priorities for these efforts should be based on
the likelihood of future major earthquakes
striking as well as the quality of design and
construction.
RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION

Standards For Repair Of Damaged
Buildings. Damage assessment and repair cost
estimating after the Lorna Prieta earthquake
were time-consuming and confusing. There was
too much duplication of effort in deciding on
methods and estimating costs of repairing
damaged structures. Consequently loans and
grants were delayed, and restoration of
community vitality retarded. Accordingly, the
State should formulate guidelines and minimum
standards for damaged building repair and
seismic upgrading. The standards should apply
unless individual local governments adopt
higher standards.
Damaged historical buildings can also pose
difficult decisions. The owner may find repair
financially infeasible whereas demolition will
remove a valuable community asset. Repair
decisions are hindered by lack of repair
financial aid, and methods of
in
advance which are the critically important
buildings that should be saved. The
Commission should help enlist appropriate
agencies and organizations in identifying and
retrofitting California's historic buildings, and

State Recovery Planning. Although
recovery from the Lorna Prieta earthquake is still
in progress and many reconstruction projects
have barely begun, several major impediments
to timely, effective community recovery have
emerged as issues of statewide interest. The State
must work in cooperation with the appropriate
federal agencies and the private-sector to resolve
these issues and facilitate expeditious recovery
from future urban earthquakes. Planning efforts
should address at least the following issues: (1)
an overly complicated procedure for processing
disaster assistance applications; (2) effective
methods of replacing affordable and low-cost
housing in conjunction with local governments
and the
(3) the
of
minimum standards for repairing damaged
buildings; and (4) formulating a practical
to decisions on repairing or replacing
historical
damaged by earthquakes.
In addition, Lorna Prieta damage of public
buildings and other facilities highlighted the
caused
temporary or long-term
closure. In order to minimize social and
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after future

Legal Issues
concerns have inhibited
Tort
innovation in the seismic retrofitting of
potentially hazardous buildings as well as the
development of seismidy resistant new
buildings. Local governments and design
professionals need a legal benchmark [standard]

that is
defined and easy to articulate for
use when their
judgement suggests
that it is appropriate to depart from existing
building codes in mitigating seismic hazards in
buildings and structures. The Commission
should enlist representatives of local
governments, design professionals, and the legal
community in developing a framework that
encourages local governments and design
professionals to exercise creativity and apply
their best judgment without unwarranted
apprehension of tort liability consequences.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Purpose of This Report
This report's primary purpose is to summarize
the results of the Seismic Safety Commission's
investigation of the 1989 Lorna Prieta
earthquake. The investigation had two primary
objectives: 1) to look for unique insights and
new information; and 2) to assess the
effectiveness of current policies, programs and
plans for reducing casualties and damage, and
meeting recovery system demands, during and
after large earthquakes. Based on the findings,
the Commission is making recommendations to
improve seismic safety and postearthquake
response and recovery in California. Some of
these require Commission response and some
call for actions by others.
Post-Lorna Prieta earthquake
recommendations and actions by the
Commission and others have already influenced
Commission programs and priorities, including
its legislative agenda, its research plan, and the
California Earthquake Hazard Reduction program.
The findings will also be reflected in
Commission activities undertaken to improve
the earthquake performance of existing and new
buildings and other structures.
Some extremely important legislative and
executive policy initiatives have already been
put into effect. One of the most striking is
Governor's Executive Order D-86-90 directing
the several state agencies having responsibility
for many of the state-owned buildings and
structures to make seismic safety a priority
consideration in the allocation of resources.
Governor Deukmejian's action resulted in part
from the findings of his appointed Board of
Inquiry on the 1989 Lorna Prieta
The Board's Report to the Governor, Competing
Against Time (May 1990), identified three

essential challenges that must be addressed by
the citizens of California, if they expect a future
reasonably safe from earthquakes:
• Ensure that earthquake risks posed by new
construction are acceptable.
• Identify and correct unacceptable seismic
safety conditions in existing structures.
• Develop and implement actions that foster
the rapid, effective, and economic
response to and recovery from damaging
earthquakes.
These recommendations also reaffirm old
lessons from earlier earthquakes. They apply not
only to the design and construction of highway
structures and bridges (the failure of which
prompted the Board's formation) but also to all
other major structures and facilities in the state.
During its investigation, the Commission
took testimony and consulted a wide variety of
sources, both published and unpublished. As
soon as possible after the earthquake, the
Commission conducted eight public hearings at
locations throughout the affected area and in
Sacramento in order to receive fresh
information from 120 persons representing
government, citizens and businessl. The
testimony concentrated on personal
descriptions of the earthquake and its damage,
and related experiences and observations
immediately after the earthquake as well as in
the weeks that followed. The
were held at these locations:

INrRODUCfiON

LOCATION
San Francisco
Oakland
San Francisco
Santa Cruz
Watsonville
San
Sacramento
Sacramento

DATE

1989
November 8, 1989
November 9, 1989
November
1989
November
1989
November 15, 1989
1989

350 serious
Almost one-third of this
damage was to older, elevated highway
structures and
These failures also caused
two thirds (42) of the total deaths. Other
damage was concentrated in the older
downtown core areas and older housing in the
communities nearest the
Hollister,
Los
Santa
and Watsonville.
the

the Commission and
and

auun1uJ"l,
HH~ U<lA\C

both the Whittier Narrows and the Lorna Prieta

uauu•xc occurred at soft soils
50-60
locations in Oakland and San
from the
severe
occurred in modern structures;
several newer San Francisco
hotels were
of
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the marine research facilities at Moss LaJ,lu•u~
and at the Oakland
which closed the
north section of a runway. the
had
lasted au'""c'"w

A series of surface fractures occurred in the
Summit Road area of the Santa Cruz mountains.
The largest of these
near the
intersection of Summit Road and
17,
was 650 feet
2.5 feet wide with a 2.5-foot
offset at one location. There continues to be
concern that the
may have
reactivated some
long-dormant landslides
through the mountainous area, and detailed
of this potential is continuing.
Despite its brevity, the Lorna Prieta
did in fact cause very signitilca11t
liquefaction-related damage in many areas from
the Salinas Valley to the
of San Francisco
Notable examples of liquefaction damage
occurred at Oakland Port Authority facilities, at

among
Marina, the foot Market Street area,
south of Market Street
and
Creek district. In areas such as
movement.

TABLE 1-1
History of San Francisco Bay Area
or greater
Earthquakes Magnitude
Estimated
Magnitude

Year

Location

Fault

1836

Hayward

Hayward (Northern segment)

7+

1838

San Francisco Peninsula

San Andreas

7+

1852

San Francisco Peninsula

San Andreas

-6.5

1858

San jose

Hayward (Southern segment)

-6.5

1861

Livermore

Calaveras

7+

1865

Santa Cruz Mountains

San Andreas

7+

1868

Hayward

Hayward (Southern Segment)

6.7

1906

San Francisco

San Andreas

8.3

1911

San jose

Calaveras

6.6

1989

Lorna Prieta

San Andreas

7.1

The newer,
artificial fills that were
created for residential development south of San
Francisco performed well, although this short
duration earthquake did not
a good test
of these filled areas.

RELATIONSHIP TO FUTURE
EARTHQUAKES
Studies of seismicity in California and other
areas where major tectonic
meet indicate

9

INTRODUCflON

that great earthquakes tend to be preceded by
periods of increased seismic activity, which then
diminishes afterward. That is, there is an
historic pattern of large and major earthquakes
clustering before a great earthquake. As
indicated on Table 1-1, after the 1906
earthquake (and a sizable Magnitude 6.5 in
1911), there was a long period of low seismic
activity until the mid 1950s, but since that time
there has been increasing seismic activity in
northern California. During the ten years since
1979, there have been four Magnitude (M) 6.0
or greater Bay Area earthquakes whereas in the
previous 68 years there had been none. This
knowledge and other scientific information
have led a working group of experts for the
National Earthquake Prediction Council to
estimate that the probability of a major
earthquake (M 7.0 or larger) affecting the San
Francisco Bay area sometime during the next 30
years is 67 percent, or 2:1. In addition, an
apparent historical relation between the
Hayward and the San Andreas faults suggests
that a significant earthquake on one fault is
followed within a few years by a similar event
on the other.

The Earthquake in
Perspective
The Lorna Prieta earthquake affected many
more buildings, people and jurisdictions than
any California earthquake since the Los Angeles
region was hit by the 1933 Long Beach
earthquake. Thus the 1989 event is the first
occasion in nearly sixty years to assess the
effects of a large multijurisdictional earthquake.
By simultaneously affecting widespread
populations, businesses and governmental
agencies, Lorna Prieta highlighted a range of
troubling problems. These will recur with even
greater severity in future big urban earthquakes
that are certain to strike, perhaps at any time.
With its estimated magnitude of 7.1, the
Lorna Prieta earthquake was the largest in
California since the 7.7 Kern County
(Bakersfield) earthquake of 1952, 37 years

earlier. As was true in Kern County, the Lorna
Prieta epicenter was located in an area of
relatively sparse population. Despite this rural
epicentral site, which was fortunate in keeping
down the damage and casualty count, the Lorna
Prieta earthquake nevertheless directly affected
the more than 85,000 individuals, families and
businesses that registered for some form of
disaster assistance. The overall secondary effects
were much more widely felt. Almost everyone in
the entire region was in some way affected.
Table 1-2 includes 17 damaging earthquakes
that struck California in the past 20 years. Lorna
Prieta accounted for over three-quarters (78o/o) of
the total estimated damage caused by all of
these earthquakes.

Major Issues Highlighted
in the Earthquake
The Lorna Prieta earthquake highlighted
several scientific, engineering and policy issues,
including some that have not commonly arisen
in recent, smaller California earthquakes.
Popular images of damage associated with this
earthquake are typified by the failure of
elevated, double decked highway structures and
bridges, including the collapse of the Interstate
880 Cypress Street viaduct and partial collapse
of a segment of the Oakland-San Francisco Bay
Bridge. Smoke from the large fire in the San
Francisco Marina district was witness to severe
damage throughout this upper-middle class
neighborhood. Soft soils throughout the area
accelerated the ground shaking that, in turn, led
to locally significant damage to infrastructure
and older residential buildings. Dramatic scenes
of deformation and facilities damage due to
liquefaction in the area controlled by the Port of
Oakland account for other memorable images of
the Lorna Prieta earthquake. Severe and
widespread damage to the vulnerable
unreinforced masonry buildings was nowhere
more dramatized than at the Pacific Garden
Mall; the heart of older downtown Santa Cruz.

10
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These
of
also
to some
of the dominant issues immediately raised
this
to the future
vulnerability of older elevated highway
structures and bridges, the acceleration of
ground shaking and associated damage to
structures located on unmitigated soft soils
conditions and the continuing vulnerability of
unreinforced masonry and other older buildings
that lack resistance to earthquake forces. While
these and related issues will be briefly addressed
in this report, they have been, and continue to
be specifically addressed by ongoing policies
and programs and have already been subject of
reports and studies by the Seismic Safety
Commission and other groups.
For the reader who seeks detailed discussion
of the scientific and technical aspects of these
issues, the following published reports offer an
excellent beginning. Much of the scientific
study of the Lorna Prieta earthquake is ongoing,
with major conclusions yet to be published.
For a comprehensive summary of effects, see

Reconnaissance
Cerrito,
Oakland] California,
488 pp.
For a detailed study of major highway and
bridge damage see Governor's Board of Inquiry
on the 1989 Lorna Prieta earthquake, 1990,
Competing Against Time: Report to Governor
Deukmejian. State of California, Office of
Planning and Research, 264 pp. Policy and
program recommendations are made in that
report and in Seismic Safety Commission, 1990,
Report to Governor George Deukmejian on Executive
Order D-86-90, 25 pp., Sacramento.
Descriptions and studies of the earthquake's
geological characteristics are provided by
Plafker, G., and Galloway, J.P., 1989, Lessons
Learned from the Lorna Prieta, California,
EarthquakeofOctober 17, 1989. U.S. Geological
Survey Circular 1045, 48 pp. and McNutt,
Stephen R. and Robert H. Sydnor (Eds.), The
Lorna Prieta (Santa Cruz Mountains), California

TABLE 1

Damaging California Earthquakes
1971-1991
Year

Location

1975
1978
1979
1980
1980
1980
1983
1984
1986
1986
1986
1987
1987
1989
1990

Oroville
Santa Barbara
Imperial Valley
Livermore Valley
Mammoth lakes
Humbolt County (offshore)
Coalinga
Morgan Hili
Palm Springs
Oceanside
Chalfant Valley
Whittier Narrows
Superstition Hills
lorna Prieta
Upland
Sierra Madre

1991

Magnitude

5.7

5.1
6.6
5.5

Estimated Direct
Damage($ mimons)Z

6.7
24.2
60.6
18.4
3.2
2.8
41.0
12.7
6.4

6.2
6.9
6.5
6.2
5.6
5.3
6.4
5.9
6.6
7.1

7,940.0

5.5

10.4

0.5

415.3
3.1

5.8

inflated to 1990 value according to Consumer Price Index. Source: Adapted from McNutt and
Sydnor 1990, p. 137.
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17 October 1989.
Mines and Geology, California
Conservation Special Publication 104, 142 pp.
The performance of buildings and
infrastructure is described in EERI (above); in
H.S. (Ed.), 1989, Performance of Structures

During the Lorna Prieta Earthquake of October
1989; in U.S. Department of Commerce,
National Institute of Standards and
Special Publication #778, 175 pp.; and in
Structural Engineers Association of California,
1991, Reflections on the October 17, 1989, Lorna

Prieta Earthquake. Ad Hoc Earthquake
Reconnaissance Committee, 177 pp.,
Sacramento.
The balance of this report provides syntheses
of the human, organizational, legal, and fiscal
of the lorna Prieta earthquake. Where
possible, policy implications are identified with
emphasis on what the lorna Prieta earthquake
experience suggests that California needs to do
in advance of the large earthquakes that are
forecast to strike major urban areas within the
foreseeable future.
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Chapter 2
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Earthquake Effects
Society's resources are at risk to earthquake
damage through failures of the built
environment. The Lorna Prieta earthquake was a
moderate geophysical event centered in a
sparsely populated semi-rural region.
Nevertheless many of the most vulnerable
structures in the area were affected by the
earthquake's forces. Within a few seconds,
approximately $7.5 billion in direct damage to
structures had been tallied.

BUILDINGS

Pretty much, the type of damage that we saw
was great damage to our unreinforced masonry
structures. The Town of Los Gatos is a very old
and proud historic town, many, many structures
built right around the tum of the century, and
even before, and unfortunately, those buildings
did not perform well.
We also had the other classic example of
cripple wall failure in our older districts as well,
just a substantial number of homes. Perhaps as
many as 10 percent of our homes have suffered
some sort of structural damage, and the majority
of that is a cripple wall failure.
Scott R. Baker
Building Official
Los Gatos
Few modern buildings were subjected to high
levels of ground shaking in the Lorna Prieta
earthquake, consequently this earthquake
should not be considered to have tested codes
and construction aimed to reduce life-safety

hazards. In a few cases, newer buildings were
severely damaged. Several were dosed for repair,
especially some hotels located on poor soils near
the San Francisco Airport. One has not yet
reopened.
Certain types of older structures known to be
vulnerable were severely damaged. In all, over
24,000 residential structures, 3,500 commercial
businesses, and 140 public buildings in the
affected ten county area were damaged as a
result of the earthquake. The most spectacular
failures involved unreinforced masonry
buildings. Many of these were located in older
downtown commercial areas, including
Hollister, Los Gatos, Santa Cruz and
Watsonville, where quarter to a third of the
buildings were severely damaged. In Santa Cruz
and Watsonville most were razed. At least 900
unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings were
damaged in the earthquake. Eight deaths
resulted from the partial collapse of URM
buildings. At least 50 of the 900 were
irreparable, and another 350 were severely
damaged. The ultimate fate of some of them is
still unknown. URM building damage was
notably correlated with soft soils locations.
In Santa Cruz County many older homes and
unbraced mobile homes sustained damage.
About 16o/o of the County's housing stock of
90,000 was affected directly. Table 2-1 shows the
type and number of damaged housing by level
of damage. Approximately 14,100 living units in
the County were damaged, of which about 900
were destroyed. Comparable data are not
available for other affected jurisdictions and no
agency keeps track of the number of actual
dwelling units affected. It is known however,
that approximately 1000 units were destroyed in
Oakland and about 500 units were permanently
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lost in San
Another 500-600 units in
San Francisco have not
vast

con'lmJu:m;nes should survey
and
homes that have
insufficient lateral bracing. It's a very
cure
to strengthen these homes and not lose your
housing stock. It wouldn't have a
impact to a community.

of Watsonville
November 14, 1989
Many older residential wood frame structures
failed
the
area.
damaged structures typically were either not
fastened to their foundations
bolts),

TABLE 2-1
Santa Cruz County: Summary
Category
Destroyed

Capitola

Dwellings
Mobilehomes

SRO

Total

Scotts
Valley

Santa
Cruz

Damage to Housing
Watsonville

Uninc.

Countywide

3
0
0

4

74

237

0
0

0

4

356
28

187

0

0

674
32
187

3

4

261

241

384

893

6
35

14
14

150
0

41

28

150

390

740

92

0

MaJor

74

1

0

2
206

25

2,228
300

705

8
greater then $10,000. Source: Santa
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had unbraced
or had
and
foundations, and almost all the failures involved
structures not built to current seismic standards.
Many wood frame residential structures in
the Marina District of San Francisco failed.
Typically these structures were four-story
buildings, with soft first stories having multiple
openings for garages and little or no cross
bracing. Failed structures were often located on
the corner of the block, where there were fewer
adjacent structures to provide support. In many
cases, inadequate maintenance, including
unrepaired termite damage, contributed to these
failures. The most common type of failure was
collapse or large distortion of the first story,
which, in some cases caused the structures to
topple into the street. The rupture of a gas line
at one Marina location resulted in the
spectacular fire seen live on international
television.
Other widespread but less dramatic damage
to residential structures was from unreinforced
chimney collapse and cracking to walls and
ceilings.
In Monterey and San Benito Counties, several
reinforced concrete cannery warehouses were
damaged by toppling inventories of stored cans
which crashed through walls and caused other
damage.

broken fuel
insufficient fuel
or improperly mounted controls. Failure of
community water systems, coupled with lack of
backup supplies, curtailed operations of several
facilities. Several reports indicated that some
equipment vital to proper diagnosis and
treatment could not be used because they were
not included in the critical emergency circuits.
Elevator cabs and counterweights jumped out
of their guides, and elevator motor sets and/or
guide rails were not securely anchored, putting
elevators out of service and causing significant
damage to the system. In a few cases, critical
hospital operations were curtailed due to failures
of hospital communications systems. In
addition, many improperly anchored chillers,
air handling units and other mechanical
equipment located on facilities' roofs were
knocked off their supports and sent sliding
across the roofs, causing significant damage. In
a few facilities medical gas storage systems
sustained damage due to poor or inadequate
anchorage. Numerous facilities also suffered
nonstructural damage due to inadequate storage
and poorly anchored shelving, spilling medical
records, laboratory chemicals, equipment and
pharmacy medications.

SCHOOlS
HOSPITAlS

Few hospitals sustained major damage,
although Watsonville Community Hospital
nearest to the epicenter suffered both stress
fractures and floor settlement. The hospital will
be replaced. There was structural and
nonstructural damage to the the Veterans
Administration Medical Center in Palo Alto,
early estimates for repair approximating $200
million dollars. A seven-story tower at Oakland's
Peralta Hospital (constructed in 1927) also
suffered major damage.
In other hospitals most damage was
nonstructural or involved systems-disruption.
Many problems were identified involving
inadequately anchored generators and fuel

Following the earthquake many public
schools in the disaster area were closed briefly as
a precautionary measure or for lack of utilities.
Most of the schools reopened soon after
inspection by qualified structural engineers and
school district maintenance personnel. Sixtyfour school districts reported damage. Most
damage was limited to nonstructural building
elements such as falling ceiling tiles and light
fixtures, broken water pipes and heating ducts,
cosmetic cracking of plaster, minor cracks in
walls, floors, ceilings and stairwells, loose roof
tiles and cracked chimneys. Two school
buildings suffered significant structural damage,
and may need to be permanently closed.
The Lorna Prieta Elementary School, located
near the epicenter, experienced significant
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due to the
none of the

~u.aa•n~·'"'

various locations within the
area.
Broken natural gas
the lrnn:~,rtP'li
effort to ensure that emergency calls within
disaster area
distance
to block
customers were without gas. The
gas distribution system in San
Francisco's Marina district was
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ears. And I remember the
hours cnrHitieri'rH!
the
in disasters. And I've
to
to mind what message we're
to deliver to
these people that are caught in that circumstance
for the future. Can they be-roll themselves into
a doorway, or be prepared to do things that the
rest of us, from the stand point of our own
protection, can do and they can't do? How do
they deal with that?
Secondly, I was very happy that the fire
station itself had been earthquake-proofed as a
part of the early disaster preparedness. Water
heaters were all strapped down, oxygen bottles
were strapped down, things-bookshelves,
computers, and things like that were held down
in place with some preparations the guys had
done prior to the earthquake. And so, one door
stuck, and that was the only thing that we really
had go wrong with our building itself. Some
telephone lines dropped, and the guys were able
to pull them out of the way without hazard. They
got the equipment out, and then it was ready to
go to work.
Everybody was in that state of shock which
you tend to get in when a disaster occurs. It's like
an eerie feeling, like uNow what do we do?" And
instincts took over. I looked across the city, and I
could see the dust rising from Main Street and the
columns of smoke beginning to develop
throughout the city.
And in our disaster plan, we had set priorities
for response. Our first priority is to respond to the
most life-threatening fire and deal with the fire
situations first; secondly, hazardous materials,
because, in our minds, there's only one
department that really can handle those two
things, with the tools and equipment and the
personnel that we have, and if they aren't
handled, they lead to much worse situations, left
untouched.
Rescue and medical emergencies-medical
emergencies and rescue actually are our third and
fourth priorities, medical emergencies because
they can be life-threatening and obviously need
but there's a lot
available to deal with that, once they get their
heads about themselves.

And in this case, Salud Para La
downtown area, set up a field clinic in
and treated a
number of the victims that
were injured
the earthquake.
I only wish we had had coordinated that prior
to the disaster so we would have had a better
handle on the capabilities our community had in
dealing with those kinds of issues.
There was a tremendous pull on the part of
the emergency responders to want to stop and
help these people. I mean, they were-the engines
were being-people were trying to stop them
because there were injured people in the streets,
and this was their only sign of help, but they had
to keep the priority in mind, in that the fires were
still going. And some of our younger firefighters
had a real difficult time dealing with that, as
they watched people watching the engine go by,
without them being able to stop and help.
Once they got to the fires-it seems like we
should have prepared for this, and maybe
subconsciously, we had, but physically we
hadn't--once we got on the scene of the fires, our
water system was gone. And the worst areas
where you're going to have the majority of fires is
also where your worst enemy is from an
earthquake, it's going to take the water system.
And you've got to compile all those worst-case
situations into an agenda that we can plan
around for the future.
Gary Smith, Chief
Watsonville Fire Department
Emergency Services Director
Even though this earthquake was not
catastrophic and required only minimal
resource support from State and federal
agencies, State and federal response systems
were activated to provide assistance as
necessary. Each affected jurisdiction activated its
Emergency Operations Center and responded
with its own resources, supplemented by
regional and State mutual aid assistance. As in
previous earthquakes, spontaneous volunteer
actions were a crucial element of local response.
Individual efforts in search and rescue,
firefighting, first aid, and traffic control saved
many lives in the first critical hours after the
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oro'Vtatn5[ information about us to our
vice versa.
Deborah Acosta
Town Manager
Town of Los Gatos

, ....1uaAc. ucu.:;uu•y speaking local emergency
responses were effective in
further
losses of life and property, but the Lorna Prieta
earthquake should not be considered a good test
of this capability.

cmnn1w1!itv and

It is important to recognize there are some
emergency response systems that worked
effectively on October 17th which could easily be
overwhelmed in an even slightly larger event, or
in an earthquake in which the epicenter was
closer to heavily populated areas, or in which the
strong ground motion lasted just a few more
seconds.
Richard Andrews
Chief Deputy Director (now Director)
Governor's Office of Emergency Services

As far as finding out what was going on, we
were in the same void. When the quake hit, our
station was thrown out ofpower also, and there
was no communication phonewise with the
assignment desk, but we did have two-way radio.
And from what I heard from the assignment
editors on the scene, they didn't have any
information from offidals. They couldn't get
through to lines at the police department, the fire
department, or any of that, so they were relying
on us for what we saw and was able to give back
to them.
Mark Richardson
KTVU Channel 20
Oakland

SITUATION STATUS INFORMATION
A recurrent theme in the testimony was that
the lack of timely official information about the
situation status hampered effective op~rations
in the hardest hit areas of Los Gatos, Santa Cruz,
and especially Watsonville. Initially, the media
were the only source of information, and in the
several hours immediately after the earthquake,
the media focused almost exclusively on the
dramatic Cypress viaduct and Bay Bridge failures
and the San Francisco Marina district fire. These
isolated incident reports gave the impression
there was terrible,
damage
throughout the Bay Area. Consequently, several
key emergency response officials felt they were
"on their own,"
them to make no
for much-needed outside help. In
several cases the media themselves were
confused.

STATE MUTUAL AID SYSTEM RESPONSE
In response to local
approximately
of fire equipment, including three
rescue vehicles, were sent through the
OES fire mutual aid system, and an equivalent
number through the California Division of
~<nr.<><:h-u and Fire Protection were dispatched to
earthquake-related incidents. The law
enforcement mutual aid system provided a
variety of resources, including approximately
175 personnel and 32 search dog teams. The
coroners' mutual aid
22
coroners
to Alameda County
deal with
St. structure

It wasn't
no idea we'd been hit. We assumed at that
vm'nc--n~auv until about eleven o'clock that
that we were on our own, that
had no
anyone. We
Area was hit
as
were.
the media was
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application of the newly developed Procedures
for Post-Earthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings,
developed by the Applied Technology Council
under contract with OES and the Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development
(OSHPD). Development of this manual was
partially funded by FEMA. These procedures had
been published only one month prior to the
Lorna Prieta earthquake, and training in their
use had only started.
Also for the first time in a California disaster,
State medical and health mutual aid assistance
was activated. The Emergency Medical Services
Authority and the Department of Health
Services filled medical/health supply and
personnel requests from Santa Cruz County.
Emergency Medical Services personnel, trained
in Critical Incident Stress Debriefing, were also
recruited from unaffected regions of the State to
provide mental health services to earthquake
responders. There was also informal mutual aid
from volunteer professionals including mental
health practitioners, building inspectors, and
attorney members of local bar associations.

SEARCH AND RESCUE

Search and rescue efforts following the Lorna
Prieta earthquake were confined primarily to
three sites: the I-880 Cypress St. viaduct collapse
in Oakland, the San Francisco Marina district
building collapses, and the Pacific Garden Mall
URM collapses in the City of Santa Cruz. At all
sites, the initial rescues were made by on-scene
volunteers.

FIRES
Fire departments throughout the impacted
areas experienced difficulties due to broken
water mains and electrical power loss.
Fortunately, the total number of postearthquake
fires was limited, and all were brought under
control within a few hours after the earthquake.
Extremely favorable, unusually light wind

conditions aided firefighters' efforts to prevent
conflagrations.
The greatest number of fires was reported in
San Francisco, where 27 structure fires occurred
in a variety of locations, with the most serious
being in the Marina district. Redundancy in
water delivery systems, which has been a major
focus of San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD)
earthquake-response planning, paid off in this
event. Breaks in both the municipal water
system and the high volume auxiliary water
system inhibited initial firefighting efforts
causing SFFD to resort to other backup systems.
Water was drafted from the Palace of Fine Arts
Lagoon and relayed to the site. Within an hour
after the earthquake, the SFFD portable water
supply system was activated, with the Fireboat
Phoenix pumping water from the Marina
Lagoon. The fire was brought under control
within three hours, and the quick response of
volunteers who assisted in carrying and using
fire hoses until support arrived is credited with
preventing further spread of the fire. SFFD
recalled 300 off-duty firefighters immediately
following the earthquake, some of which were
transported by helicopter under agreements
made previously.
Several small structure fires were reported in
Oakland but were brought quickly under
controL There were also several fires associated
with the 1-880 Cypress Street viaduct collapse. A
major fire in Berkeley-originally reported by
the media to involve the public libraryoccurred at a towing service garage. It required
all the resources of the Berkeley Fire Department
to bring this fire under control.
Santa Cruz County reported over twenty
fires, with only one reported in the City of Santa
Cruz-that totally destroyed a single family
residence. Watsonville reported three structure
fires-one involved a single family residence,
and the others destroyed two mobile homes.
These fires are believed to have started because
gas lines were severed when the homes slid from
their pre-earthquake locations. Due to water
main breaks, the Watsonville Fire Department
experienced difficulty in fighting these fires. The
department had no water tankers or water pools
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to draft from. Fire control was achieved
plotting locations of gas-fed fires and requesting
Pacific Gas and Electric Company to do
emergency shut-offs. In the Redwood Estates
area of Santa Clara County, a residence fire was
ignited by a ruptured propane tank. Because the
community's entire water distribution system
was destroyed, the fire was fought by drafting
water from the community swimming pool.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

The only major hazardous materials spill was
at the UNOCAL oil refinery, involving 840,000
gallons of unleaded gasoline. This spill was
quickly handled by UNOCAL with assistance of
the Richmond Fire Department, the Coast
Guard Marine Safety Office, and Coast Guard
Strike Teams. Another smaller spill at the Kelly
Moore facility in San Mateo County involved
100,000 gallons of latex paint, which spilled
into San Francisco Bay. Sloshing of the contents
of open vessels caused several hazardousmaterials incidents, but secondary containment
prevented materials from escaping to the
environment.

COMMUNICATIONS

The event of this quake underscored several
important factors that are known to emergency
services personnel and planners. And of them,
number one, when the quake struck, water mains
broke, gas mains broke, fires occurred, buildings
collapsed, people were trapped in buildings byand struck by falling debris on the streets,
emergency agencies were swamped with calls,
and emergency communications systems in effect
broke down due to overload, and the coordination
between the agencies and utilities during the
event, because it became so overwhelming,
became fragmented.
Frank Blackburn
San Francisco Fire Department

The telephone communications system in
the Bay Region sustained little damage, but
emergency measures taken to control line load
affected emergency communications. To
prevent damage to the system from overload the
telephone companies block incoming calls, thus
reserving more service for outgoing calls.
Because the disaster area involved more than
one area code, it was extremely difficult for the
OES Region 2 office in Pleasant Hill to
communicate by telephone with heavily
impacted jurisdictions in the southern counties,
especially Santa Cruz.
Back-up emergency communications systems
functioned quite well in filling the short-falls of
the telephone system, although individuals
assigned to monitor several telephone lines, as
well as radio receivers, could not physically
respond to all incoming communication
attempts.
Although California response agencies own a
rather limited number of cellular telephones,
the cellular phone system was partially effective
in supplementing field communications. In the
days following the earthquake however, Cellular
One, a cellular telephone company, donated
200 portable battery-powered cellular
telephones to emergency response personnel for
unlimited free usage. The principal problem in
using the telephones was saturation of the cell
when more than a dozen telephones were in use
in one place (e.g., the Cypress St. viaduct
collapse).

EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION
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One of the other things we learned was about
the media-they're going to be a key player in
actually responding to an event. We've realized
that we have to get the news out, especially if it's
good news. Good news wasn't coming out very
clearly.
Thomas Mounts
Emergency Preparedness Officer
City of San jose
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As

in an
like Lorna
local television and radio stations focused
primarily on covering the event, rather than on
providing emergency public information. In
addition, the broadcasts painted an uneven
picture of the location and extent of earthquake
damage. Emergency public information
activities following the earthquake were more
responses to inquiries by the media than as use
of the media to communicate important
information to those persons inside and outside
the impacted area.
The Lorna Prieta earthquake disaster
immediately attracted the attention of
worldwide news media that were present in the
Bay Area for the World Series. Local and State
agencies in the affected areas dealt with on-site
media who flocked to the various damage and
emergency operation center locations. The State
Office of Emergency Services (OES) activated its
Emergency News Center, which was staffed
around the dock throughout the response phase
by nearly SO public information officers from
various State agencies, under the direction of
OES.

Conclusions and
Recommendations
In formulating recommendations based on
the Lorna Prieta earthquake
the
Commission reviewed the range of actions
suggested by the many local officials who
testified before the Commission. The
suggestions include ways to reduce the
destruction in future
and ways to
deal with immediate nnch>:>Tt
service demands. These recommendations are
coupled with more
conclusions of the
Commission's committee on emergency
response.
after the Whittier Narrows

va;nu•u y not adequately prepared for these
exJ>ected events. The committee outlined major
actions to be undertaken immediately to help
remedy an emergency response shortfall that,
unless met would increase the impact of a
devastating disaster.

EARTHQUAKE HAZARD MITIGATION
Voluntary hazard mitigation is limited by
several factors; but primarily by personal risk
denial, and competition for scarce funding
resources. The Commission supports many of
the recommendations made at the hearings and
in other forums. Generally, the officials who
testified recommended the following types of
activities:
• Public education about earthquake risks,
methods of hazard reduction, and
preparation of households for emergency
response and short-term relief
• Development of earthquake-resistant
construction techniques, and codes and
standards for upgrading existing buildings
• Extension of seismic retrofitting
re<IUirerneJrus to all structures, including
homes built before seismic safety codes
were enacted
• Requiring mobile homes to be braced to
resist seismic forces
• Identification of areas of high earthquake
risk for zoning and permitting processes
• Development of policies to mitigate
vu•.cwuar damage to essential and high
occupancy facilities in high risk areas
officials from the three
communities where homeowners sustained
much
to older
homes
the State to
where mobile homes were most
uaAu"''''"""' recommended that the state

.,.--"·-~,theErrlerJ~rlcy

often
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gas
fires.

IMMEDIATE AND SHORT-TERM
RESPONSE NEEDS
Local officials caught up in survival response
cannot be expected to give the State immediate
assessments of the total picture or make precise
requests for equipment and personnel.
Consequently, the State OES should be
authorized to send resources to the areas
impacted by an earthquake automatically and
without delay. We already know there are sure
to be immediate demands for fire engines, water
tenders, portable water mains, rescue
equipment, and many emergency response
personnel.
The State should also require a minimum
number of routine emergency response
exercises, with State participation and review. In
several cases, communities reported that recent
practice with their plans, as well as the August
1989 State/federal Response '89 exercise, made a
very positive contribution to effective and
timely response immediately after the Lorna
Prieta earthquake.
Several officials reported that the ATC-20
rapid damage assessment method and OES's
volunteer inspector program were very
important and helpful. At the same time,
however, needed improvements in the method
and the program were suggested. A system for
accurately posting damaged buildings is needed,
capable of using all appropriate languages. The
system should be universally adopted and
qualified persons, including out-of-town
inspectors and structural engineers, should be
trained in the inspection and posting
procedures, to reduce inconsistencies and
confusion. The posting forms should be easy to
use and structured for compatibility with
computer data management systems.
The State should
guidance on
procedures to inform building owners and
tenants of options for access to damaged
buildings. Procedures for obtaining inventories

rlPVPilnriPrl in
consultation with local emergency services
annn1P'\ro: State
and FEMA

Recommendations by the ErrterlgerKy
Planning and Response Committee of the
Seismic Safety Commission are summarized
below under five headings: emergency
management system; communications; mass
care and shelter; medical services; and training. 4

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
There is an urgent need to enhance, expand
and improve California's current Emergency
Management System. The system should be
standardized, integrated, understood and
accepted. It must be organized from cities to
counties to State Regions, and finally to the
State Operations Center and state agencies. It
should consist of existing, functioning day-today organizations. Parts of this system are
currently in place and functioning with
differing degrees of standardization and
effectiveness. To accomplish this, several
recommendations are suggested, as follows.
• Emergency Management Operational Area
Organizations should be mandated and
implemented for all cities, counties, and
State Regions.
• OES should conduct an extensive training
program in the concept, organization,
functions and operating procedures of
Emergency Management Operational
Areas to help develop a standardized
Emergency Management System for all
California governmental emergency
organizations.
• The Governor's Office of Errterj~ertcy
Services (OES) should encourage all
counties and Operational Areas to enter
into statewide mutual aid

4 From "Earthquake Emergency Preparedness and
Response: A Report to the Seismic Safety
Commission." Emergency Planning and Res,poJase
Committee Report, October 17, 1990.
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communicated back

the emergency

"
disaster
emergency u"u"'&~··"'~'
administrative mutual aid.

survivable communications.
MASS CARE AND SHELTER

COMMlJNICATIONS
Additional
into the process of
for and
emergency care and shelter. For needed
advances in mass care and
the
recommendations are made.
..
between state and local

"
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program.
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Chapter 3

eco ery Issue
Overview of the Recovery
Process
Although earthquake recovery involves all
sectors of a community, local governments have
the major responsibility of managing
postearthquake recovery and reconstruction, an
overwhelming and unanticipated burden. An
earthquake changes a community's agenda and
priorities for several years, and local decisionmaking is often constrained by the regulatory
limitations of disaster assistance programs.
The most difficult issues emerge when the
initial emergency period is over. While they
resemble many that local officials deal with
regularly--e.g., economic
land
use, housing,
and ~~U~,,u,.,
standards-the environment is radically
different. Public
concerns and eagerness
to return to normal quickly push the process
and may limit the time available for decisions,
but this can still be
slow and drawnout.
It is commonly
that rebuilding after a
major earthquake falls into three or four
(1) The first month is generally devoted to
damage assessment, clearance, very
temporary
and emergency
or
repairs. (2) The remainder of the first year
largely involves demolition, nrr'""'"''n'a
temporary
and facilities for dislocated
and making more extensive
of minor damage and of
infrastructure
and public facilities.
It then takes two to four
or more years to
reconstruction tm)iects
housing and other
Some observers
say that it can take up to ten years for a
community to recovery
that is to arrive to

the level of vitality it would have
if the
disaster had not occurred.
In light of this pattern, it should not be
surprising that the reconstruction process had
barely begun, 20 months after the Lorna Prieta
earthquake. For instance, of the 34 buildings
demolished in downtown Santa Cruz, one had
been replaced. In downtown Watsonville, none
of the 22 demolished or severely damaged and
unoccupiable buildings had reopened or been
replaced. In Oakland, 450 very-low-income
victims were still housed in what amounts to
temporary shelters. Any complete study of Lorna
Prieta earthquake recovery and reconstruction
will therefore need to follow the process for a
few more years. There may be
lessons from this
which the
Commission should continue to observe. Several
issues have already
and can
be articulated now. The dominant issue is
housing.

Housing Replacement
It has often been observed that disasters tend
to
and speed up the development of,
ongoing social and economic trends in a
community or region. This
dramatically exposed this '"u"'"'"-r
the ugly
of the low-cost
in the greater San Francisco Bay Area.
A recent Association of Bay Area
Governments
indicates there is a
low income unit shortage in the
area.
Currently there are 15,000 people on an
Oakland
housing waiting
and of the
very low income persons that do have
of them are
well over
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of their income for rent.
The IOV'<-oost uuu:>1u:>:.

income persons live in the state's
vulnerable
The
housing situation in Santa Cruz
microcosm of the regional problem for
vulnerable housing. The problems revealed by
this earthquake dramatically underscore what
should be expected when the major urban
earthquakes occur in California. The following
testimony of Luther Perry (Santa Cruz County
Housing Task Force) illustrates these points.

Our best estimate is that we have something
on the order of 3,000 people without homes. To
give you a sense of how that might look
percentagewise, those destroyed and majordamaged housing units correspond to about 31/2 percent of our entire housing stock.
In the Cities of Santa Cruz, Capitola, and
Scotts Valley, the housing loss was relatively less,
approximately one percent of their housing stock.
In the City of Watsonville, it was about 8
percent, and in the unincorporated part of the
county, where there was a wide variation, the
average was about 4 percent.
Now, numbers like 1 and 4, and even 8
percent of housing stock, are not-they're not real
big numbers until you put a little bit more
perspective on it. In all parts of the county, our
typical apartment and house vacancy rates,
before the earthquake, were in the vicinity of one
percent. What that means is, in the Cities of
Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley, and Capitola, the
number of dwelling units that are out of service is
approximately the same as the entire preearthquake vacancy rate.
And, of course, there's not an even match
between houses that are lost and ones that are
available that are vacant.
In the City of Watsonville, the number of
dwelling units off-line, the number of families
out in the cold, represents something like 800
percent of the vacancy factor in that town. That

28

every
vacant unit.
The stories that
two and three
to a
people
in garages, that is very strongly true in the
Watsonville area, and it is those buildings that
took the heaviest damage. So, retrofit on older
frame structures is a significant issue, and
Watsonville demonstrates that in spades.
Also, over half of the mobile homes that are
off their foundations are in the Watsonville area.
In most of these cases, the mobile homes are off
their foundation so spectacularly that it's
interrupted the utility service and has supports
sticking through the floors of mobile homes. Yet
people continue to attempt to occupy those,
because they would rather live there than have to
go into a tent or out into the cold.
I don't know what kind of magic to offer, but
if there are procedures or approaches or
construction practices that keep mobile homes
from being thrown off their foundations, that
would be 500 units of housing, right there, that
had significant to major damage-we could be
saving a lot ofgrief for a lot of people, and
particularly for a very vulnerable population, the
elderly population.
The second major problem are those
downtown, single-room-occupancy (SRO) hotels
in Santa Cruz. Like almost every city in this
state, those are older hotels-they're no longer
economical for other purposes, and they're
converted over for single-room occupancy, either
among people who are one step above being street
folks, or for older people who not only are on
limited income, they're on poverty income.
So, we have 400 people who, just like that,
they have no place to live, the buildings are in the
fenced-off areas, red-tagged. These are primarily
elderly people, impaired folks, or people who have
a history of mental or alcohol type problems.
They were living in a stable situation, and now
suddenly they're out on their ears.
I think there's a lesson here, that when you
have a very strong earthquake and you are as
close to the epicenter as we were here-the loss of
housing units is indeed very much larger than
anyone had led one to believe would be the case.

"""'...,'"''C.'""''""""'"' OF ASSISTANCE TO

REPLACE LOST HOUSING
the

housing ..... ""'"''""r
believe it had the authority to direct HUD to do
so, and HUD did not agree to assume the
.n.u.uu•uxu section 402 of the
Stafford Act authorizes FEMA direct federal

the
of the federal response
and Hurricane
Of
the GAO's

is a summary of the GAO's
based on the GAO's
Disaster Assistance:
and local
"'"j"""'"·"' to Natural Disasters Need
1991).
to the GAO study, the Lorna Prieta
was the first
disaster in a
urban area where the problem of
or replacing low-income uuu~•ux
occurred. The Lorna Prieta earthquake struck an
area that had a serious shortage of affordable
rental housing for low-income
and a
low vacancy rate for all housing.6 According to
5 HUD defines affordable rent as not more than 30
percent of income for someone with 80 percent of the
median income of the area, adjusted for family size.
6 HUD considers vacancy rates below 5 percent (4 to 6
percent, depending on the rate of growth in the area)
to be low. In areas hardest hit by the earthquakeAlameda, San Francisco, and Santa Cruz counties-

disaster funds.
In
1990, HUD Region IX officials
proposed using (1) $44 million in federal funds
to help rebuild damaged or demolished housing
and (2) 2,000 5-year rental assistance vouchers
to aid victims while the housing was
rebuilt. However, HUD headquarters did not
fund this proposal. HUD allocated 500 rental
assistance vouchers and 664 moderate
rehabilitation certificates to the earthquake
disaster area. It took 4 months to provide the
vouchers, and local authorities in one locality
vacancy rates prior to the earthquake ranged from 0.8
to 2.9 percent.
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u"~'"'"'" warrant attention now.
The Commission's
for
communities' abilities to manage the recovery
process from
urban
include

on progress the federal
the
nA>'Y~mr recommendations.
that the Director of FEMA should coordinate
with the
of HUD and other
and
uu•~u5in

recovery plan for low-income victims. The
second is that the
should either
clarify whether section 402 of the Stafford Act
authorizes FEMA to direct HUD to assist state
and local governments in rehabilitating or
reconstructing housing for disaster victims or (2)
amend sections of the United States Housing Act
of 1937 and the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 to provide for
appropriations directly to HUD to fund housing
assistance for disaster victims.
Answers to these questions will provide the
framework within which California can launch
its own planning process to deal with this
difficult issue.

and Federal disaster assistance provisions
and delivery. The application processes
and eligibility criteria for disaster
assistance programs need to be simplified
and streamlined to expedite assistance to
victims.
• We need to know more about the effects
of recovery process on regional economies
and governments' fiscal health
• We need to know how to create and
maintain the sociopolitical climate that
will contribute to effective recovery
management.
Resolution of these and other issues that will
emerge as communities continue their recovery
is a matter of statewide interest. Developing
practical methods and approaches to resolve
these issues are integral to both implementing
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local planning efforts and to development of the
State plan for earthquake recovery.

STATE RECOVERY PLANNING

The Lorna Prieta earthquake highlighted the
disruption encountered when damage to public
buildings and facilities leads to temporary and

long-term closure. The State and its agencies
and institutions must now begin preparing
plans for their own temporary relief and longerterm recovery in order to minimize the level of
postearthquake social and economic disruption
both to the communities where state facilities
are concentrated and to the state's employees,
clients and university students.
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Chapter 4

Costs and Funding
Introduction
The Lorna Prieta earthquake resulted in
approximately $8.0 billion in damage to
buildings, building contents, infrastructure, and
other direct costs. Indirect economic losses from
the earthquake are poorly defined, but they
appear to have cost approximately $2 billion
dollars. In total, the Lorna Prieta earthquake was
approximately a $10 billion event which
corresponds to about $1700 per person for the
six million people in the ten county affected
area. The $10 billion dwarfs the economic
impact of other US earthquakes, but is still a
factor of five to ten smaller than the economic
impact expected for large earthquakes in major
urban areas. [Based on a 1980 FEMA memo,
adjusted for inflation, a M 6.5 on the
Inglewood-Newport fault would cause $112
billion in damage.]
This section describes the costs and recovery
funding sources for the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
An overview of the economic impacts of the
earthquake is also presented. Data are primarily
available on a regional basis and these are
augmented, where possible, by local and
anecdotal information where such data are
helpful in providing for a fuller understanding
of the economic impacts of the earthquake.
Primary data were not collected; rather, existing
information was compiled and analyzed.
Earthquake damage and loss estimates must
be interpreted with caution. No agency has the
responsibility to compile comprehensive
damage and loss information on a consistent
basis after an earthquake. Rather, a variety of
organizations each compiles fragmentary
information based on their own programs and
needs. Consequently, there is no wellestablished process by which comprehensive

damage and loss information is systematically
collected after an earthquake. Firm estimates
from engineering studies may be combined with
rough guesses about approximate damage levels.
Criteria for assessing damages and assigning
values to losses vary widely. There are no
uniform standards for the repair of damaged
structures which makes it hard to estimate total
repair costs. Compilations of damages may be
incomplete in some cases and double counted
in others.
Damage is defined here as the direct cost to
repair or replace buildings, building contents,
and infrastructure damaged by the earthquake.
In general, data about damages to public
facilities are more complete and reliable because
there is a public accounting of governmental
costs. Private sector damage data-from
individuals, to small businesses, to large
corporations-are subject to larger uncertainties.
The complete reconstruction process-from
engineering analysis, to planning, to financing,
and to completing construction-may take
several years to a decade or more after a major
earthquake. Therefore, it may be many years
before the costs of replacing facilities that were
damaged or destroyed in the Lorna Prieta
earthquake are fully known.
Other direct earthquake costs include such
things as removal of debris, security in damaged
areas, disaster response and management
expenses, medical costs, and the dollar cost of
loss of life. Accounting for some direct
earthquake costs is sometimes commingled with
"normal" operations, and thus estimates of the
extra costs generated by an earthquake are
sometimes difficult or impossible to obtain,
particularly for the private sector.
Indirect earthquake losses include costs
associated with such things as business

estimates are crude and are
limitations and sp~:~citic
Funding for recovery after an
comes from a wide variety of sources, including
federal, state, and local governments, voluntary
organizations, and the individuals, businesses
and other organizations affected by the
earthquake. Public-sector recovery funding data
are generally much more precise than damage
and loss data, because such funding is formally
appropriated, and detailed accounting of
expenditures is generally available. Privatesector recovery funding data are sparse, except
for selected nonprofit organizations.
The following compilation and discussion of
economic losses and recovery funding
associated with the Lorna Prieta earthquake first
reviews damage and other direct losses, followed
by reviews of indirect losses, and sources of
recovery funding.

Direct Losses
The California Office of Emergency Services
(OES) has compiled damage assessments
reported by the affected counties for both
private and public facilities. The assessments
were conducted within two months of the
earthquake and they have not been
systematically updated since that time. OES now
tracks information it needs on a case-by-case
basis. The total damage to public and private
facilities
federal-aid eligible
and
was estimated as $5.94 billion
1990a). Of this
billion is
billion is
million is in undetermined miscellaneous

costs due

<U~UH''-"t gas,
and water
waste water
and telecommunications facilities are poorly
defined.
at
and harbor facilities
may have been as much as $200 million (SOR,
1989). Reconstruction, restoration and recovery
of the gas and electric utility systems may total
about $100 million (PG&E, 1989). Total damage
to infrastructure, other than highways and
bridges may total approximately $0.5 billion. At
least some of this damage is included in the OES
compilation discussed above, although some of
the reporting counties appear to have used
incomplete and/or noncomparable criteria for
including/ excluding certain facilities in their
damage reports.
In addition to building and infrastructure
damage, the Lorna Prieta earthquake also
resulted in other direct costs for debris removal,
protective measures in damaged areas, and a
host of other response and recovery costs. For
the public sector, estimates of debris removal
and protective measures total $103 million
(FEMA, 1991). No estimates of such costs are
available for the private sector. It appears that
direct costs other than damage probably exceed
$200 million.
The Lorna Prieta earthquake resulted in 62 or
63 deaths and 3757 reported injuries (OES
1990a). Based on a statistical value of $1.7
million for a human life (Keech, 1989) and
roughly estimating the value of injuries at
$10,000 each, the direct human/medical costs of
the earthquake may have been approximately
$150 million.
the total direct costs of the
other than damage to buildings,
contents, and
exceeded
$350 million.
To examine ~"'""t>'
sector, there are two additional
sources, other than the OES estimates: insurance
settlements and
value assessments for
nrr""l&>Th7 tax reduction purposes.
to
the California
of Insurance
insured losses from the Lorna Prieta

accurate estimates of the

and other losses such as Route 17 in the
Santa Cruz mountains and the Embarcadero
];'"""""''"" in San
had
effects that affected tr:.nc:•vwt:~tiinn
the
area. If one million commuters were
one hour in each
and the
average value of their time is $10 per
then
such
delays resulted in indirect
losses of
million per day. Given that the
was closed for a month and other
a
reasonable estimate of indirect losses due
must be in the range $1
billion or more.

l>"''"''"'' very difficult to obtain.
"'"'"""""''"" values reduced property tax
about $4.6
Total business losses from the
reduced San Francisco's tax revenues
about $15 million in
with an
additional loss of
million in
taxes
from buildings demolished or declared
uninhabitable
In
in revenues from hotel taxes and about $20
million in sales taxes from tourists. Tax losses to
the
for tourism-related activities may have
been in the range of $10
from
Lorna
Prieta
At least short-term nn,df•:!T"Cht111:'

least short-term
on tourism and
occupancy
hard-hit areas such
and San Francisco. Air travel

estimate.

related taxes, reduced assessments due to

residents and businesses
the Federal Reserve Bank to be
billion ,. ...,..... ,"

~v>i·u'~'"'"

disaster recovery
total between

billion.
of the
Lorna Prieta
appears to be more
the affected area prc1ba!blV
recovery costs ''"""H-'"""
significantly more than the Federal
Reserve Bank's
estimate.

FEDERAL PROGRAMS
seven
after the Lorna Prieta
the United States ~o:mness
$2.85 billion in

SBA disaster loans

years.

STATE PROGRAMS

LOMA PRIETA'S

due to various
periods, late
and earned interest on
funds to be allocated (Board of Equalization,
1991).
In April 1991 the California Department of
Finance issued a status report of funding. This
information is synthesized in Table 4-1.

PRIVATE PROGRAMS

Private sector expenditures in response to the
Lorna Prieta earthquake included various types
of insurance, a wide range of efforts by
voluntary organizations and, finally,
expenditures by individuals and companies
affected by the earthquake. As discussed above,
total insurance payments were approximately
$681 million; this total will undoubtedly go
somewhat higher as remaining claims are settled
through negotiation or litigation.
A wide range of volunteers responded to the
Lorna Prieta earthquake. In the hours
immediately after the earthquake, volunteers
played important roles in search and rescue
operations. During the relief and recovery
processes, thousands of volunteers and dozens
of voluntary organizations provided various
kinds of assistance to individuals and
organizations affected by the earthquake.
The American Red Cross collected donations
from throughout the world and over $78
million were designated by donors for use in
relief of Lorna Prieta earthquake victims. This
large pool of donations is unprecedented and
probably results from live television coverage of
the San Francisco Bay World Series which had
begun just prior to the earthquake.
As of May 1991, the American Red Cross
allocated aU donor contributions that were
~~·"~'>'""''""'"' for this

victims in 50 shelters
in addition to direct cash
persons for replacement Of basic T\Pl"<:ITn<ll
property and rental assistance. This program
also provided services by over 7,000 volunteers
and nurses, 40 mobile feeding vehicles and
more than 126,000 nights of shelter (American
Red Cross, 1991).
The Red Cross Special Disaster Relief Fund
has thus far assisted nearly 10,000 people
through grants made to local agencies in 61
collaborative projects for transitional and
permanent housing, mental health,
employment, and legal and human services.
With these funds, almost 1,200 housing units
are being rehabilitated or newly constructed.
The remaining funds continue to support
various programs including a Client Advocacy
Program (serving more than 2,500 families),
disaster planning, and reserves to meet future
earthquake-related needs in Northern California
as identified.
The Salvation Army had spent $5 million
within the first 45 days which helped over
227,000 people, served 100,000 meals and
provided groceries, clothing, furniture and
medical supplies to very low income persons
and families. Uke the American Red Cross, the
Salvation Army's work with the earthquake
victims continues with a particular emphasis on
providing transitional housing in Santa Cruz
(for older persons) and in Watsonville (for
families).
Northern California Grantmakers (1990)
compiled a list of 57 foundations and
corporations who contributed more than $19
million to Lorna Prieta relief nnPT~tnrm<.:
contributors (above $1
james Irvine Foundation, Pacific Gas and
LlC'-"''-• the San Francisco
and
of the
Area. The total charitable
contribution '"'~'u'-''-''11~ thousands of
volunteered
at
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least $100 million and perhaps significantly
more.

Conclusions
The Lorna Prieta earthquake resulted in about
$10 billion in direct damage and indirect losses.
Publicly funded disaster relief and recovery
program expenditures will total $3 to $4 billion,
with $6 to $7 billion being absorbed by the
individuals and organizations (both private and
public) in affected area. Precise and accurate
damage and loss figures after an earthquake are
generally not available. Most comparative data
from preliminary damage assessments are made
in the first few days after the event, primarily to
gage the disaster's magnitude and help qualify

for state and federal disaster declarations or
other assistance. These initial estimates are
refined relatively little thereafter. No
organization is obligated or has a strong interest
in continuing to compile generalized,
comparable damage estimates, and there is no
central organization responsible for compiling
and coordinating data about recovery funding.
Indirect loss estimates are very crude and subject
to very large uncertainties. Public sector
recovery funding is fairly well accounted for.
Except for insurance information however,
private sector loss and recovery funding data for
this earthquake are virtually nonexistent. These
losses can be derived only by estimating the
difference between total estimated damage and
losses less public sector recovery funding.
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LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO ACfiON

TABLE4-1
Loma Prieta Funding Status Report: April 1991
ACTIVITY

PROGRESS OR STATUS OF
IMPLEMENTAnON

TOTAL OBLIGATED/EXPENDED
(Dollan In Thousands)
State
Federal
Total

EXPENDITURES:
Transportation
Develop revised seismic
standards for earthquake
resistance to be utilized in
the design and
construction of new state
highways and bridges,
and for retrofit of existing
highways and bridges.
Initial appropriations: $81
million.

Research to develop solutions to
multicolumn retrofit and to ultimately
update standards is underway. Twenty
contracts are in process or near award.
Sixteen contracts for single-column retrofit
have been awarded and three more projects
are advertised. Right-of-way costs are
included in construction contracts.

5,129

0

5,129

52,265

57,347

(research)

5,082
(construction)

Emergency public ferry
The Federal Emergency Management
and surface transportation Agency (FEMA) has denied all ferry system
participation. The Department of
services.
Transportation (CALTRANS) is appealing the
rejection of $3 million in claims previously
approved. (*NOTE: The state's funding of
this program is from various transportation
funds. It is not anticipated at this time that
these costs will be reimbursed from the
Disaster Relief Fund.)

2,000*

0

2,000

Various street and
highway repairs and
reconstructions for which
the state is responsible
(streets and roads for
which local governments
are responsible are
included in the Local
Government element of
this report). Both the
Federal Highway
Administration and FEMA
participate in funding
these repairs.

25,396

288,898

314,294

Caltrans has prepared a comprehensive list
of all projects (approved, pending, and
denied). Essentially, the smaller projects are
completed or underway. The majority of
roads and highways damaged in the
earthquake are open and operating
normally. Some major projects not yet
funded and/or completed include the
Cypress Street Viaduct replacement, the
Embarcadero Viaduct, and the Terminal
Separation project.
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HOUSING

0
In most cases,
administered by
agencies under guidelines
1"1''"""'"".... "'~'~ by the Department of
and Community Development (HCD).
Where local governments are participating,
commitments are made only after
the
governments have completed
final review and have submitted the
application to HCD for final approvaL Of
the 2,1 05 applications submitted to date,
649 have been received by HCD and 1,294
are being reviewed by participating local
governments. The remaining 162
applications have been denied. It is
anticipated that approximately 100-200
additional applications will be received.

Farmworker Housing
Grant Program for
rehabilitating farmworker
housing. Appropriation:
$1.5 million.

Three applications were received and the
full appropriation was committed
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1,500

0

1,500

1.9
.2
1.1

1.0
LOCAL

79

$

562
24
8
1,547
827
1
0

Alameda

Contra Costa
Marin
San Francisco
Santa Clara
Santa Cruz
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LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO AGriON

ACTIVITY

PROGRESS OR STATUS OF
IMPLEMENTATEON

FEMA
in
various
government
recoveries, including
facilities, city/county
roads, emergency
response costs, etc. The
state will pay the full 25
percent share of the
required local match for
FEMA funds for this
disaster.

hundred and eighty-seven applications
were filed by local government entitles. Of
this number, 154 were approved for FEMA
funding and 155 were granted eligibility
under the state NOM provisions. Many
unresolved issues remain as evidenced by
more than 70 active appeals. The largest
recipients under the federal program are (in
millions):
$28.5 San Francisco
18.4 Oakland
1 3.9 Santa Cruz County
9.8 Port of Oakland
4.8 City of Watsonville
4.2 City of Santa Cruz
2.4 Alameda County

TOTAl OBUCATED/EXPENDED
(Dollars in Thousands)
State
Federal
Total

PRIVATE NONPROFIT$
Specified private
nonprofit organizations
eligible for federal and
state funds.

FEMA received 330 applications and
approved 242. Of these, 126 were also
approved under the NOM program for
state funding of the FEMA-required match.
Changes in both the federal and state
disaster assistance authorities have resulted
in private nonprofits becoming the largest
single applicant pool. To date, the
Watsonville Community Hospital is the only
applicant that has exceeded the state cap of
$5 million per private nonprofit
organization. Also, payment of state funds
to all religious organizations has been
suspended because of the apparent
prohibition of such payments under the
state Constitution. The largest state
and/or federal obligations to date are for
the following organizations (in millions):
$39.5
3.9

2.7
1. 7
1.6
1.6

Watsonville Community Hospital
Redwood Mutual Water
Company
Stanford University
Mercy High School/San Mateo
Youth Center
Golden Gate University
St. Francis Youth Center
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9,059

58,849

67,908
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K-1 SCHOOL
DISTRICTS
1

to some
have
eligibility and
have
received awards. Applicants are still being
required to submit additional documentation, 18 months after the event. In addition,
USDE is restricting awards to cover repairs
only to predisaster conditions, without
consideration of current codes and
for
standards; and, no supplemental
additional work or increased costs directly
associated with disaster damage are
currently being accepted. This could
increase the commitment from the state to
fund the necessary work. To date, USDE has
only committed a total of $6.6
In
contrast to USDE, FEMA has accepted
claims from 86 districts and approved 62 to
date for a total of $3.6 million.
n~'''"'"''nr<::

participation is
to
restoration of
noninstructional facilities
and is, therefore, much
smaller.

INDIVIDUAL
ASSISTANCE

Victims of damage to
Bridge and I 880
structure.

A total of 409 applications have been
received, including 149 for death
and 260 for personal injury and/or property
damages. Emergency awards totalling $3.6
million and settlements totalling $35.2
million have been paid. Two settlement
conferences have been held and the Board
has processed
60
of
the claims submitted.
paid.

of the
Program complete:
period for unemployment
benefits.

'l\1 "''"""r
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41

0

0

3,1

41,500

3,161

LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO ACI'ION

ACTWITY

PROGRESS OR STATUS OF
IMPLEMENTATION

Individual family grant
program which provides
up to $10,400 (75%
federal funding, 25%
state funding) for persons
with serious needs and/or
necessary expenses
resulting from a natural
disaster. Should a
claimant have qualified
needs in excess of the
basic grant, the state may
provide a supplemental
grant of up to $10,000.
FEMA assistance to
individuals (temporary
housing and shelter)

A total of 38,81 3 claims were received. Of
those, 28,376 have been approved, 9,984
were denied or withdrawn, and 45 3 were
identified as duplicate claims. Total
expenditures for grants are expected to be
approximately $50.3 million ($15.7 million
state). This includes $4.2 million for the
State Supplemental Assistance Program.
Costs for administration are an additional
$7.8 million ($1.7 federal and $6.1 million
state). This program is virtually complete.
Only the appeals filing period, which closes
May 6, 1991, remains open.

21,815

36,268

58,083

Of 38,21 3 applications received, 14,086
have been approved and 24,127 were
denied or withdrawn. The high rate of
denial appears to be a result of FEMA's very
restrictive regulations defining eligibility.
The program is complete.

0

29,919

29,919

SBA assistance to
individuals (direct
mortgage and personal
property loans)

This is traditionally the largest single
program for individual disaster assistance.
Of 18,739 applications received, 11,391
have been approved, 7,299 have been
denied or withdrawn, and 49 are pending.
The program is virtually complete.

0

306,450

306,450

97,000

0

97,000

Personal income tax relief. It is estimated a total of $114.9 million in
tax relief will be granted by allowing an
extended period (5 years) for writing off
losses.

Total Expenditures/
Obligations to Date

TOTAL OBUGATED/EXPENDED
(Dollan In Thousands)
State
Federal
Total

364,296 11197,560 1,561,947

*Less expenditures not
anticipated for
reimbursement from the
Disaster Relief Fund

(2,333)
(2,333)
361,963 1,197,560 1,559,523

Total Expenditures/
Total expended through Apri11991 (many
Obligations SubJect to obligations remain to be accounted for).
Federal and Disaster
Relief Fund
Reimbursement
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ACTIVm

PROGRESS OR STATUS OF
IMPLEMENTATION

TOTAL OBLIGATED/EXPENDED
(Dollars In Thousands)
State
Federal
Total

REVENUES:
TEMPORARY SALES

TAX
Increase the sales tax by
1/4 cent for 13 months
(December 1, 1989,
through December 13,
1 990) to raise funds
specifically for Lorna
Prieta earthquake
recoveries.

Like all California sales taxes in 1990, the
amount collected for the Disaster Relief
Fund was less than originally anticipated.
Actual receipts are $21.9 million less than
the original estimate of $785 million.

Source: California Department of Finance, April 1991
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Chapter 5

Legal Issues
The State of California and some of the local
governments hardest hit by the Lorna Prieta
earthquake have been the subject of tort claims
alleging wrongdoing by their officials before and
after the Lorna Prieta earthquake. Private-sector
owners and tenants of properties, as well as
third parties, have been parties to litigation
involving personal injuries, property damage,
and 63 fatalities related to the trembler. This
section on the legal issues of the Lorna Prieta
earthquake provides an overview of the
allegations, the legal theories, and the defenses
identified in litigation related to the October
1989 earthquake. It is not intended to be an
exhaustive study of liability issues attending
natural disasters or earthquakes, but, rather,
serves to illustrate the types of cases, the
peculiarities of earthquake damages, arguments
proffered, and dispositions to date.

Public-Sector Issues
STATE GOVERNMENT: 1-880 CYPRESS
STREET VIADUCT & THE OAKLAND-SAN
FRANCISCO BAY BRIDGE
A total of 42 people were killed and 108
injured when the Interstate 880 Cypress Street
viaduct and a segment of the Oakland-San
Francisco Bay Bridge collapsed during the Lorna
Prieta earthquake.
In November of 1989, the Legislature met in
special session and determined that to aid the
victims of the collapse of these two structures it
was necessary to create a special fund for the
payment of personal property, personal injury,
and death claims arising from the disaster.
Although the liability of both state and local

governments is generally controlled by the
provisions of the California Tort Claims Act, 7 in
that special session the Legislature also enacted
Section 997 et seq. of the Government Code to
compensate victims of the two collapse disasters
without regard to liability, fault, or
responsibility, and without the necessity of
litigation against the State of California or its
officers or employees.
This hybrid "no fault" procedure has so far
proven to be quite successful in processing
claims and compensating victims of the two
collapses. However, some claimants' attorneys
believe there were certain shortcomings, 8 such
as the absence of direct, supervisory power by
the judiciary in the appointment of the
"settlement master." They contend that if the
duties of the settlement master had been more
precisely defined, or had he been given the
power to act as an arbitrator and issue binding
decisions upon both parties, some cases would
have settled even sooner. Further, they allege
that the six month deadline for the resolution
of claims, originally intended to require speedy
settlement of claims, has been used to force
some clients to either accept inadequate
compensation or to commence traditional tort
litigation against the State. At least 14 claimants
have decided to reject the State's settlement
offers under this extraordinary legislation and
are pursuing traditional tort litigation, and the
number of those choosing to litigate their
claims is expected to grow.
The overall success of this novel "no fault"
approach to the Lorna Prieta earthquake may set
7 See Section 810 et seq. and 900 et seq. of the
Government Code.
8 Correspondence from the California Trial Lawyers
Association commenting on an early draft of this
report.
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a precedent for future damaging seismic
occurrences. However, any final evaluation will
have to await the termination of the Section 997
no fault process and the results of subsequent
tort litigation, if any, related to these structure
collapses.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Some of the cities hardest hit by the Lorna
Prieta earthquake have also been the subject of
claims alleging wrongdoing by officials before
and after the event. The major examples of the
typical allegations, legal theories and defenses
raised as a result of the October 1989 earthquake
follow.9

Inverse Condemnation. A relatively small
number of building owners10 have alleged that
their buildings were demolished by local
government without good cause, or without
notice or opportunity for hearing, in violation
of Article I, Section 19 of the California
Constitution and/or the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
A second category of owners alleged the same
theory, claiming that only part of their
buildings needed to be destroyed and thus total
destruction constituted an unconstitutional
taking.
Some of the inverse condemnation-related
issues that have arisen in the aftermath of the
Lorna Prieta earthquake are:
• Inverse Condemnation Claims by TenantsClaims for loss of personal property were
filed by tenants in retail and office buildings
demolished after the Lorna Prieta earthquake.

9 For a broader treatment of this
Flandrick, Governmental
Immunities During Emergencies:
After an Earthquake, submitted to the
California Cities, Earthquake Recovery Wc;rks:hoo.
November 9, 1989.
10 As an
the
of Hollister had four
inverse condemnation
all of which have been
settled without resort to triaL

• Conversion of Personal Property-Some tenants
claimed it was an unlawful "conversion" 11
to dispose of their personal property without
providing them an opportunity to salvage
personal property after building demolition.
• Negligent Demolition-There were three
categories of claims regarding negligent
demolition arising from the Lorna Prieta
earthquake:
1. Owners claiming that only partial
demolition was needed;
2. Adjacent property owners claiming that
their buildings could have been saved
but for the fact that the adjoining
building, often with a common wall, was
removed thereby weakening the
"undamaged" building; and,
3. Some owners claiming that their
undamaged adjacent buildings were
damaged by negligent removal of debris
such as dropping debris through the roof
of the building, or damaging walls or
foundations with heavy equipment
while demolishing adjacent buildings.
• Interference with Economic Advantage or
Contract-Business proprietors have claimed
interference with economic advantage and
interference with the lease contract between
the tenant and property owner.
• Conspiracy-Tenants and property owners
have alleged cities, city officials and/or
elected officials conspired with state or
federal agencies to obtain federal money by
demolishing the property owners'
buildings.12

11 The term "conversion" is defined as an
unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over goods or personal property belonging
to another, to the alteration of then condition, or the
exclusion of the owners rights; the unauthorized and
wrongful exercise of dominion and control over
another's personal property, to the exclusion of, or
inconsistent with, the rights of the owner.
12 In such a claim, the plaintiff must show that there
taken by cities
was an 'unlawful agreement".
after the declaration of a disaster
Governor are
Act,
controlled by the California
Government Code Section
to demolish buildings were
performance of discretionary tuiJLCti!ons
employees in carrying out the
the Employee and city are immune
Government Code Section 8655
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or
intentional tort, such actions for emotional
distress are barred. 13
Because
few inverse condemnation
claims were made in the aftermath of the Lorna
Prieta
and they appear to be
without resort to
as well as the pr<)tracl:ect
of time it will take to
and
subsequently
any claims actually
litigated, definitive conclusions or insights are
not available at this
There is,
one previous related claim from the 1983
that may prove
inverse
condemnation claim.
The only
California case,
a
published appellate decision, involving the
summary demolition of an
resulted in a decision

summary
for the
the Court of
found that at least two
triable issues of fact existed.
was there a
The conclusions of a
and the State Office of
"·"''"r<>Pr11rv ·'"''-m''"'" as well as the fact that the
waited 57 days to demolish the building,
raised at least an inference that the
was
not a hazard.
factual questions were
raised as to whether the Roses voluntarily
consented to the destruction of the building by
the release or whether it was signed
under the influence of duress and
misrepresentation.
The appellate court decision in the Rose case
teaches:
1. In an emergency situation involving the
of its citizens, a city can
with a due process
and
demolish a building
If the
demolition is challenged, the
bears the
burden to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence the
for immediate
destruction.
any doubt exists as to whether the
is
an administrative
should be held at which the nrr>nt>rhr

A
filed on
warning all persons
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an "etnerg;(~n<::v" py,>rnntlnn
Sect. 21
if no true emergency
officials are
discretion" under the
the demolition is
and an
environmental review may have to be
conducted prior to demolition.l6 (See
discussion regarding Santa Cruz's L.rAJI"\c-reHJciet
over demolition of the St.
Hotel below).

CEQA-based Lnl!g~n:uJn;
Hotel Case. A coalition of
groups
a local group, Friends of the St.
""''"·'"'"''"· the California Preservation
and the National Trust for Historic vr<•c""'"
filed a laWSUit tO 7lTP•VPr1t

an imminent
the contention the mere
passage of time establishes that an imminent
threat did not exist. The
demolition
Pnrrn1Pf•n· determinations
to public safety.
In an unpublished opinion reviewing the
trial court's
the Court of
found little probability that
opponents would
on the merits of their
argument:
"First the trial court has found dear and
evidence that the uuuu.lll)<.
nn~se:nts an imminent threat to the
health and
The evidence of record
that
Therefore
to follow the

'-'";v'"c. Preservation interests decided to

the demolition h.,.,,.,,,.,
the "'"'!""'''"'"''"

Demolition
Hotel Was
State Review-Section 5028 of

note a, p. 5-5, supra.
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and concluded that it
an imminent threat.
be done to lessen the threat to ad]iaomt
structures other than sm·ro1Jn(:Hn
with fences in the middle of '"''"r••n
from
successfully further contended that if
the St. George's owner elected demolition to
abate the nuisance and the State would not
allow the municipality could be left
to abate the nuisance; a structure that "''"~'""'"t"n
an imminent threat of harm,
to
established statewide (OES) criteria, could not be
removed.
nn><:Pnt~·rl

U<A>CAHCUIO

Protracted CEQA-based Litigation Would Have
Caused Disproportionate Injury to the City
Cruz-Relying on Mills v. County
(1979) 98 Cai.App.3d 859, 861, the City of Santa
Cruz successfully contended that a
in the
demolition of the St.
while the
case was further appealed by demolition
opponents, would cause dis.nr<)n<Jrti
to the party which
should issue. The Court of

Demolition

Were Minimal-The sole claim

the
named as a
in an
district. The district had been listed

criteria.

lH=><v''"

..

"

more uuu.._,....a,
was harmful to the
owner and tenant;
of demolition

property

new
investment in Santa
•
in demolition uc1avcu
affordable housing;
"
resulted in the loss of revenues to the
of Santa Cruz; and,
"
in demolition would have caused
which
the
of the
St.
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house was constructed some nine
The

structures. Some claimants have
fashion a
which
found if the trier of fact establishes that
etc., knew the uu'"'"''""'
was hazardous and failed to wam "'"!"'""'"

contained the

'"'"'"!"''"'"• Tort Claims Act, although such
immunities are not absolute.
the fact
that cities
are not liable for failure to
for
violations or hazards to
~"''"'""'""''r•t Code Section 818.6), recent
court decisions have
the
of
to collect damages when a known risk
causes a foreseeable
or u"""'o'""'""''" the individual

ns]oec:tors will also be entitled to immunity
are found guilty of actual fraud,
rr>lCTHr>Tlr>Yl Or actual
and in SUCh an
event, the
would have no legal
'"'"·"~">''"'"'" for such a judgment. Although
aH<eg<lti<ms of
corruption and malice are
simple to include in a complaint,
difficult proof problems, particular
when the
acts or nonactions took place
many years previously. Plaintiffs assert the right
their claims at this late date based on
~"''"''" rule that the statute of limitations
does not commence to run on a cause of action
for fraud until the fraud was reasonably
and based on their statement that
did not know of the defective construction
until the
their house.
As

vt\..~a<u'--

any claims
any definitive conclusions or
in time.

no.
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geological reports before permit applications
could be considered.
The public reaction to the geologic review
requirement was almost immediate and
uniformly negative. For most people, concerns
about geologic hazards ended with the shaking;
concerns about future hazards from landsliding
and other types of failure were too remote and
speculative compared to their immediate
recovery needs. To be fair, geologists could not
provide a clear and precise assessment of
potential hazards in many areas, nor were they
able to provide assurance of safety. This
uncertainty greatly diminished the political
palatability of a geologically cautious approach
to rebuilding. As of the Spring of 1991, only one
inverse condemnation-type suit has been filed
over the rebuilding/permit issue,20 but there
have been reports of noncompliance and
rebuilding without geotechnical review or the
required permits. In addition, one class action
suit has been filed seeking damages for an
alleged interference with property rights
resulting from a County ordinance requirement
of a recorded Declaration of Geologic Hazard
which includes: (a) a disclosure of the pendency
of an areawide geologic study of a potential
landslide hazard resulting from the Lorna Prieta
earthquake; (b) a waiver of any claims related to
the issuance of a damage repair permit; and (c)
an agreement to hold the County harmless from
any third party claims relating to the issuance of
the repair permit. The suit has not (to date) been
served on the County of Santa Cruz.
Class Action Litigation for Low Income
Renters (Smith v. FEMA). Several thousand
low cost rental units were severely damaged and
destroyed in the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
Among these were 2,07021 single room
20 Olson v. Messier, Santa Cruz Superior Court No.
113121.

21 Of these 2,070 units 114 units in Alameda County
have already been approved by FEMA for funding
through other means and therefore are not further
eligibfe for the benefits described herein. Since the 114
units are not eligible for funding under this
agreement, that number of units and the
corresponding number of dollars for each unit are not
included in the settlement.

occupancy (SRO) or equivalent low income
units that were made uninhabitable by the
earthquake. These units were located in
Alameda and Santa Cruz Counties and the City
and County of San Francisco. Of these 2,070
units, 388 were in San Francisco, 1,117 units
were in Alameda and 565 units were in Santa
Cruz. The denial of assistance to persons
residing in this lost low-income housing
resulted in the Smith v. Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) class-action
litigation that was instituted against FEMA by
the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County.
The plaintiffs in Smith v. FEMA were members
of a class of low-income persons who prior to
the earthquake were living in single room
occupancy apartment units and who, following
the earthquake, applied to FEMA for but were
denied temporary housing assistance benefits
under Section 408 of the federal Disaster Relief
Act (42 U.S.C. Sect. 5174). Plaintiffs were denied
these benefits on the grounds that either they
had not resided continuously in the same rental
unit for at least thirty days prior to the
earthquake, and thus were deemed to be
ineligible for benefits under FEMA's 30-day
continuous residency requirement ("the 30-day
rule"), or they shared a rental unit with one or
more other unrelated individuals prior to the
earthquake, and were denied benefits under
FEMA's requirement that only one check be
issued per household (the "shared housing
rule"). Other plaintiffs in this litigation were
members of a class of persons who were not
given notice of their right to appeal the denial
of their applications for benefits or were
otherwise adversely affected by alleged
inadequate procedures on FEMA's part in respect
to the appeal process.
As a result of a settlement of the Smith v
FEMA suit, FEMA has agreed to provide three
types of benefits:
• It will make funding available for
replacement of single-room occupancy or
other equivalent low-income housing units
which contain a private sleeping room in
each unit (SROs) and shelter units which
were rendered uninhabitable by the
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earthquake, to the extent such funding is
requested by local governments or owners or
operators of private nonprofit facilities;
• It will make funding available for
reimbursement to local governments for
special housing vouchers, to provide interim
temporary housing for individuals who were
denied temporary housing assistance benefits
under the 30 day rule; and,
• It will provide housing assistance benefits for
individuals whose claims were initially
denied under the "shared housing" rule. In
addition, FEMA has agreed to give notice of
appeal rights to individuals who did not
receive such notice initially and to
promulgate guidelines for appeals.
The total maximum amount of monetary
benefits authorized pursuant to the settlement
agreement for replacement of housing is
$23,040,000.22 The individual breakdown of
allocations per county is:

Count)!
S. Francisco
Santa Cruz
Alameda

Total

address the issue of low cost housing in any
recovery effort. 23

Private-Sector Issues
Private-sector litigation arising from the
Lorna Prieta earthquake appears to be centered
on traditional disputes between insurance
companies and their policy holders, and
personal injury/wrongful death issues.

INSURANCE ISSUES

FEMA 75% Share

$5,535,000

$4,151,250

5,925,000

4,443,750

11,580,000

8,685,000

Although this case resulted in a settlement
which does not constitute binding, legal
precedent, it does provide a litigation model for
future earthquake-related suits challenging how
FEMA may employ eligibility criteria in future
seismic disasters. Given the high probability of a
major earthquake occurring in an urbanized
area of California within the next 30 years, the
combination of yet another loss of a large
number of low cost housing units and the
limited fiscal resources to replace them may
make Smith v. FEMA the prototype for further
uu;o:.auvu to
the federal government to

22 FEMA is responsible for funding only 75% of
county expenditures,
$23,040,000, unless
waived.

the

of 75% of
percentage is

Some 30 lawsuits were filed in Santa Cruz
County in the aftermath of the Lorna Prieta
earthquake, alleging that major underwriters did
not give the victims all the help they were due,
a charge that one major carrier denied, noting
that of more than 27,000 claims totalling $120
million, it had received only 28 complaints. It is
also alleged that claims adjusters lacked
experience or training, and that damage claims
were improperly closed with no or insufficient
payment to victims.
A major source of compensation for those
injured or killed in the Lorna Prieta earthquake
was workers' compensation. The concept of
workers' compensation is based on liability
without fault, and although there are specific
limitations upon workers' compensation
23 A year and a half after the Lorna Prieta earthquake,
many low income Bay Area residents are still living in
homes with leaking roofs and unstable foundations.
Many homes have serious structural damage caused by
the earthquake that has still not been repaired.
Concerned community groups and low income
homeowners directly affectea by the unfair practices
filed an administrative petition in June of 1991
alleging that the agencies responsible for
compensating homeowners for needed rel')airs, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
the Department of Social Services' Individual and
Family Grant Program (IFGP), have denied low
income homeowners their fair share of relief.
Petitioners are demanding that an oversight
committee review cases to identify those people who
were not adequately compensated; that FEMA/IFGP
make additional funds available to those people; and
that policies be changed so that the victims of future
disasters are not also subjected to reputedly
discriminatory practices. Inasmuch as the petitioners'
administrative remedies have not been exhausted as of
this date, a suit has not been filed.
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payments,24 "acts of God" are not among them.
A more complex workers' compensation-related
issue involves the Cypress structure and whether
employees were commuting from their jobs.
While courts have developed "the going-andcoming rule" that excludes workers'
compensation coverage of regular commuters,
litigation may yet arise over whether there was a
business purpose to some victims' trips. More
research of this issue will be necessary, as will its
relation to the Legislature's "no fault" claim
procedures that were instituted to compensated
victims of the Cypress Street viaduct and the
Oakland-San Francisco Bay Bridge collapses. As
of this date, the California Department of
Insurance reports that 419 Lorna Prieta-related
claims have resulted in payments of $2,496,000.
The Lorna Prieta earthquake also brought to
light another earthquake-related coverage
problem. In an unpublished decision denying
review of an appellate court decision, the
California Supreme Court rejected a Mill Valley
homeowner's claim that insurance should cover
newly required "code upgrades:•25 Although
this denial of review does not set a legal
precedent, it nonetheless has the effect of
requiring the purchase of specific riders because
damage payments only cover "equivalent
replacement," not restoration in-kind of code
updates or restoration of the "historic fabric" of
a building.

SAN FRANCISCO'S "WAREHOUSE" SUIT

The litigation arising from the five deaths
caused by the alleged earthquake-related partial
collapse of an unreinforced masonry building,
known as the Warehouse, located at 175
Bluxome Street in San Francisco, provides the
definitive example of the private sector tort
claims arising from the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
The case against the partnership owning the
Warehouse was premised upon three theories of
liability, termed "causes of action": traditional

negligence resulting in wrongful death; strict
liability; and, maintenance of a public nuisance.
Although not a cause of action, punitive
(exemplary) damages were requested by the
plaintiffs. The basis for the requested imposition
of punitive damages was an allegation that the
owners knew that the building had partially
collapsed previously due to inherent structural
problems and that it would not survive a
moderate earthquake. It was claimed that the
owners were advised that the structural
deficiencies created a risk that the building
might partially or totally collapse at any time
and would be subject to collapse during a
moderate earthquake. These allegations were
supported by copies of engineering reports
prepared for the defendant partnership. Despite
this alleged specific knowledge, it was claimed
that the defendant partnership deliberately
failed to take any actions to correct the claimed
structural deficiencies or warn others of the
allegedly dangerous and defective condition of
the building. The plaintiffs contended that the
foregoing alleged actions and omissions
constituted a conscious disregard for the public
safety amounting to reckless conduct resulting
in the fatalities giving rise to the suit.
Available court documents indicate that the
defendant partnership's primary defense was
apparently based upon a claim that the fatalities
were the result of an "obvious act of God," and,
further, that punitive damages are
unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, from the academic
perspective of learning from earthquake
litigation, this suit was settled by the parties,
and the issues were not resolved at trial and
scrutinized by an appellate court. Consequently,
no definitive case law will result from this
litigation. Hence, the "act of God" defense still
may be legitimately plead. The legal
applicability of strict liability and the
imposition of punitive damage to those who
maintain a building known to be unsafe in an
earthquake also remain unresolved.
Compounding this lack of resolution is the fact
that the settlements in this case contained a

24 See Section 3600 et seq. of the Labor Code.
25 See McCorkle 11. Stale Farm Insurance, Aug. 15, 1990.
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provision imposing secrecy about the case.26
However, a recent announcement indicated that
the owner will pay $4.9 million to the families
of three of the five people crushed to death and
to an injured worker. The settlements were
disclosed after confidentiality agreements
expired October 1. Lawyers for the victims said
it was just one of the first of significant
payments from the building owner on claims
that injuries were caused by earthquake safety
defects.
It should also be noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court has expressly rejected the argument that
punitive damages are unconstitutional, and
claims for punitive damages may still be
legitimately pleaded in earthquake-related
litigation. (See Browning-Ferris Ind. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., (1989) 109 S.Ct. 2909). Hence the
next damaging earthquake will probably see
these issues revisited, and perhaps resolved.

Conclusions
The legal aftershocks from an earthquake will
continue long after the seismic aftershocks.
Already, however, one may distill the following
conclusions from the discussion above.
Damaging earthquakes strike California on a
regular basis; earthquakes with a magnitude of 6
or greater on the Richter scale have struck 102
times in the 140 years since California became a
state. Every populated urban area in California
has been struck with damaging forces and will
be again. Seismologists currently believe there is
a 67 percent chance of a major earthquake
striking the San Francisco Bay area, and a SO
percent chance of a similar magnitude
earthquake occurring in southern California
within the next 30 years. This makes the
occurrence of a great earthquake not a question
of "if" but rather of "when." Advances in

26 Senate Bill 711 (Lockyer), introduced on March 6,

1991, would bar such secrecy in settlements by
providing that, as a matter of public policy, in civil
actions based on personal injury or wrongful death no
confidentiality agreement, settlement agreement,
stipulated agreement or protective order which bars
public disclosure of such an agreement shall be valid.

seismology and engineering allow governmental
leaders and planners to recognize where quakes
may occur, to anticipate approximately when
they will occur, and to make reasonable
estimates of their expected intensity. Also, the
phenomena that cause ground failure are
known as well as the types of structural design
and construction that are prone to failure. Both
the private-sector and the public-sector have
been able to predict with reasonable certainty
what the economic impact of a great quake will
be for specific areas of the state. Inasmuch as
California earthquakes are demonstrably
foreseeable and far from being unexpected or
extraordinary occurrences, neither an
earthquake nor the damages occasioned by an
earthquake may be termed "an act of God."
Settlements of private-sector suits, negating
trial and appellate court review, will leave many
legal issues unresolved in the area of traditional
tort liability, as will the "no fault" procedures
implemented by Government Code Section 997
with regard to the Cypress structure and Bay
Bridge collapses. The lack of legal precedent will
be further exacerbated unless the appellate
courts are more willing to certify earthquakerelated cases for publication as reported cases,
e.g., the St. George Hotel decision.
One of the major lessons is that it is
extremely difficult to make well-considered
decisions on technical issues such as geologic
safety in the emotionally charged atmosphere
following a major disaster. While the normal
development review process is focused on long
term safety, the earthquake repair process is
unavoidably focused on expedited recovery.
jurisdictions wanting to address geologic safety
following a major earthquake--beyond
minimum seismic standards-can expect strong
pressure to relax those standards and expedite
recovery. The lawsuit27 against Santa Cruz
County, and enforcement litigation, if any,
relating to planning and the permit process,
arising out of the Lorna Prieta earthquake
should be closely monitored. Their outcome
could seriously affect government's ability to
27 Olson v. Messier, supra, note 12, and the unserved
class action suit noted at page 14.
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Introduction
in its
of the lessons of the
Lorna Prieta earthquake, the Seismic
Commission held eight
in several
most affected
the
While
there was similarity in the
striking impression is that the issues and
experiences emphasized in some locales were
quite different from those in others. Watsonwas
ville's Lorna Prieta earthquake
different from Oakland's. It is not
that
affect individual communities
based on many
social
and economic factors. In an effort to
these differences and
the
exJDerien.ces of the
affected by the
contracted with six
own suggestions and recommendations for
'-H'u'J"'-"' in policy and programs that would
assist the state and other communities in future
un"'"'"""· The six
individual reports for inclusion here are: Los
San
Santa
of Santa
The Commission's overall direction was that
the
should consider four

brief

""w"''" an array of
susuzesti<>ns for
'"""'"'"'""'"'''nt in
and programs dealing
with the earthquake hazard.

Synthesis of Community
Recommendations
In
its recommendations based
on the Lorna Prieta a~ .... , . , , , , ,
the Commission
affected communities. The suinzesti<ms
ways to reduce the level of destruction in future
to deal with immediate
""'_,..__public service demands, and to
the effectiveness of programs
recovery and reconstruction
processes. This section '-v•uvuc.:.
recommendations
for
the State of California.

HAZARD MITIGATION
The communities recommended that the

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AFFECTED COMMUNITIES

"
seismic
codes were enacted
Identification of areas of

""~f"'"'''- '89 exercise made a very
contribution to effective and
after the
mu·ct~·n that certain

Of~J.lLl'C~

<>

risk areas
the three communities whose
homeowners sustained much of the
to
older single family homes
the State to
require appropriate retrofitting of such
dwellings. The community in which mobile
homes were most severely damaged
recommended that the State
mobile home bracing. These actions would not
only reduce damage and repair costs, but would
also reduce the
for fires. When these
single family homes and mobile homes shift
during an earthquake,
often sever
gas lines, and gas leaks are
sources of
fires.

IMMEDIATE AND SHORT-TERM
RESPONSE NEEDS
The State's immediate response to an
"""' ... ''"'" should be
The State

Management Operational Area organizational
scheme. This often requires six levels of
bureaucratic approval for cities' requests for
resource authorization (obtaining mission
numbers). It was further suggested that advance
for routine requests be agreed to
in the form of memorandums of understanding.
Communities reported the ATC-20 damage
assessment method and OES's volunteer
inspector program to be very important and
helpful. At the same time, improvements in the
method and program were widely suggested. In
several cases, the process became
controversial and very difficult to manage. A
is needed for accurate posting of
and
should be
'"'''"~""'·J· The
should be

demand for fire
water

for
Several communities endorsed the
Command
and stated that the State
should

Local coordination between the business
and
after a disaster

management. Not
was it rPr\nrtPrl
but also its use
among local
This in tum
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for emergency response does not work in the
longer term recovery period.

COMMUNITY RECOVERY
The communities were unanimous in calling
for flexibility in implementing disaster
assistance programs to facilitate coordination
with local programs and staff and adaptation to
local practical realities. The community reports
had many examples of inappropriate or
troublesome programmatic applications. Design
and management of recovery programs should
be as simple as possible. Current program
administration is too complex. Administration
is decentralized, diffuse and enormously
encumbered with required paperwork and
demands for documentation. In short, the
disaster assistance application and review
processes need a thorough overhauL
Several communities called for revising State
and federal assistance relating to temporary
housing assistance (long-term shelter needs).
The assistance guidelines have only limited
applicability to the timely replacement of
damaged buildings that house low-rent housing
units. In a major urban earthquake, thousands
of such units will be severely damaged and
destroyed. In many cases, marketplace
economics will not support replacement of this
housing at all, let alone as low-rent units.
Thus, thousands of tenants will be effectively
and permanently displaced from housing, and
there are currently no State or federal disaster
assistance programs to deal with a housing
problem of this nature or magnitude. One
community suggested distribution of blockgrant money through local housing agencies as
a partial solution to this problem.
Confusion and associated time delays were
widespread concerning local jurisdiction costs
that FEMA would or would not reimburse.
Several communities called for State/federal
guidance on the types of costs that would be
considered eligible for reimbursement. From
observing this process in the Lorna Prieta
earthquake, some jurisdictions concluded that

many State/federal Public Assistance Program
decisions were unnecessarily arbitrary. Some
also found the dollar amounts ultimately paid
insufficient to cover legitimate costs.
Although the premise of federal disaster
assistance funding is replacement of damaged or
destroyed facilities "in-kind," aid needs to be
available for "reasonable betterment." It was
suggested that some kind of loan program be
established by the State and made available to
local governments to pay for replacing such
things as old and inadequate storm drain
systems. Even though they may have been only
partially damaged they cannot merely be
patched up for future use in a downtown area
being rebuilt.
Some basic redevelopment legislation should
be written and ready for adoption in an
emergency, or else be adopted in a generic form
and ready for quick modification to meet
postearthquake needs. One city estimated that
availability of such State legislation "on the
shelf" would have helped avoid a lot of
uncertainty and as much as six months delay in
recovery financing.
The State should require local jurisdictions to
develop community recovery plans with at least
as much emphasis as is currently placed on
immediate emergency response. Recovery is
much more complex than immediate response,
and in most cases will result in more dramatic
and longer-lasting implications.
When damage is widespread, local
jurisdictions, particularly smaller ones, lack
capacity for unilateral response to the recovery
needs of their communities. Local plans should
be developed to include adopted postearthquake
recovery policies certified by the State for the
long-term community recovery. Such plans and
policies should address at least the following
topics:
• Specific plans for providing consistency with
State or federally mandated hazard
mitigation plans
• Standards for the repair of damaged
buildings, including historical buildings
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" Criteria for the demolition of severely
damaged buildings, including historical
buildings
" Standards for acceptable alteration of
discretionary land use approval processes
" A State policy outlining and defining the
range of local discretion expected to be
exercised in recovery and reconstruction land
use policy
" Criteria for requiring stricter-than-normal
standards in land use and construction,
where justified by postearthquake data
" Pre-earthquake review of financial
regulations for local government budget and
accounting procedures, to assure the
expeditious conduct of local government
business in response and recovery
Finally, it was commonly observed that
owners who had earthquake insurance were able
to avoid many delays and other problems. This,
in turn, reduced the recovery workload and level
of monetary need from disaster assistance
programs. Accordingly, several communities
suggested that the State find ways to encourage
owners to purchase earthquake insurance.
The six sections that follow were written and
made available by jurisdictions affected by the
Lorna Prieta earthquake. While the material has
been edited for language and style, the contents
as submitted, expressing frustrations, along with
suggestions and conclusions, remain intact.

Town of Los Gatoszs
The Town of Los Gatos is located in the
foothills of the Santa Cruz Mountains and
covers about 11 square miles, including hillsides
as well as flatland areas. The
as of
january 1,
was 28,197. The October 17,
1989, the Lorna Prieta
caused
to the Town. The
stock in Los Gatos is comprised of many pre1900 structures,
in the downtown.
residential structures were ,_.,.,u''l'.'-·~
because
either did not have a <v<ul\.-""·'v'
28 Submitted

the Town of Los Gatos,

were not bolted to the foundation, or had a
pony or
wall failure. There are also a
number of unreinforced masonry (URM)
commercial buildings in the downtown area
which sustained damage.
One of the biggest causes of damage to
residential properties was cripple wall failure,
in the old Victorians. Some of these
homes jumped off their foundations and
dropped three to four feet when cripple walls
collapsed. In Los Gatos, homes that were bolted
but did not have adequate shear walls sustained
more damage than homes that were not bolted
at all. Then Governor Deukmejian vetoed a bill
that would have required older residences to be
bolted to their foundations and the installation
of shear wall panels wherever necessary. The
primary basis for this veto was a concern that
the cost of mandatory retrofitting would pose a
burden for especially fixed-income
homeowners. The Town recommends that this
issue be reconsidered. At the very least,
residences should be required to have shear
strength and the foundation bolted at the time
of resale.

BUILDING PERMIT PROCESS
It is important for cities and counties to
develop policies on procedures that will be used
in an emergency before a natural disaster occurs.
A clear vision of where the community wants to
go and where it wants to be is essentiaL The
Town had not done this prior to the earthquake,
and had to scramble to prepare and adopt new
policies following the earthquake. The Town
Council held an emergency meeting on the
Sunday after the earthquake to establish pvu~''-"
for
and restoration. A
restoration program was established to handle
various earthquake-related applications, such as
u-.uHJu•"~v.'"'' reconstruction of structures,
relocation of displaced
and
:>n>rwn.v:. l to use a motor home or
housing.
trailer as
Fortunately the Town Council had a dear
idea of what it wanted. The Council adopted

of Planning.
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and

unreinforced masonry structures.
Ordinance 1801
for the demolition of

historic or a
"'"""'vu, any

demolished
a POJttlo•n
structure rather than
Of the more than 800
structures,
three commercial buildings were completely
de:stn)V€:d as a result of earthquake damage.
Twenty-five residential structures had been
nnrr"TPri for COmplete demolition as Of January
1, 1991. Two commercial and eleven residential
buildings approved for demolition were
considered to be historically significant.
To assist property owners, the Town's
Planning Department developed the following
handouts:
1. Guidelines for Repair and Reconstruction
of Earthquake Damaged Buildings
2. Application Procedures for the
Demolition of Residential/Commercial
Structures
3. Administrative Procedure for Temporary
Housing Due to the Earthquake
4. Application form for the relocation of
businesses displaced by the earthquake, or
repair or reconstruction of a demolished
structure (ERC approvals)
A property owner has two options for
reconstructing a building which was partially or
completely demolished. The Town Council's
Guidelines for Repair and Reconstruction of
Earthquake Damaged Buildings specify that
replacement structures are to be identical in size
and use to the original structure, or in cases
where remodeling was done, they may be
rebuilt as they previously existed. Up to 100
square feet of floor area may be added to
residential buildings under the restoration
process. If an applicant proposes to construct a
replacement structure that is substantially
different from the original, or to add more than
100 square feet to a residence, the regular

fees are
assessed. The intent of the Council's
was
the Town back to what was before the
The fee waiver and streamlined
review were offered as incentives to nrr'"'"'"+-'
owners to encourage
what
prior to the
time and cost.
The Town Building Department established a
fairly complete list of
properties
shortly after the earthquake. On November 6,
1990, a letter was sent to approximately 300
property owners who had not applied for
building permits advising them of filing
deadlines to qualify for fee waivers. On
November 16, 1990, a letter was sent to owners
already having building permits advising them
to get an addendum to their permit (or to
obtain a new permit if any additional work was
to be done above that for which the original
permit was issued). Advertisements were also
placed in local newspapers to alert property
owners of filing deadlines. The Town
encouraged property owners with questions or
unusual circumstances to talk with staff
regarding their specific situation.
In spite of these efforts to notify property
owners and encourage them to start the
restoration process, there were, as of January
1991, approximately 200 properties which were
"yellow"- (limited entry) or "red"- (building
unsafe) tagged that had not notified the Town
of their intentions regarding repairs.

BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS
Although the restoration process has been
very successful and many damaged buildings
have been repaired or rebuilt, the Town is
confronted with a number of problems. There
are many property owners who have not yet
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approached the Town for information or to
submit an application for repair work. One
reason for this is people have had a very hard
time reacting and making decisions. Fifteen
months after the earthquake, there are property
owners who are still waiting for approval of
loans, or for insurance settlements. Public sector
funding for earthquake repairs has been almost
nonexistent. Few owners have obtained Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Small
Business Administration (SBA) or California
Disaster Assistance Program (CALDAP) loans. So
far, 25 CALDAP loans have been approved and
funded by the state and two property owners
have received Red Cross grants of $30,000. It has
been very frustrating for both staff and property
owners who cannot otherwise proceed with
restoration projects. The question of whether
earthquake insurance should be mandatory has
been a major issue in Los Gatos. The owners
who had earthquake insurance or were
independently able to finance their projects are
the ones who have been most successful in
getting their businesses reopened, and/or
getting damaged structures demolished,
reconstructed or repaired.
Another unforeseen problem is how to
handle normal activities in addition to dealing
with the emergency situation. Only a few days
after the earthquake, contractors were in the
Building Department requesting inspections and
permits for ongoing projects, and residents were
requesting approval of business licenses and
home occupations from the Planning
Department. People who are not personally
affected by the crisis expect to receive the same
service that they usually get.

HISTORIC PRESERVATION VS.
DEMOLITIONS
is an
issue for
like Los Gatos which have a

nr<'""'rvatinn

historic
Town and on individual

nUHlPrtu

demolish structures right away before they
could even be properly inspected and evaluated.
The only buildings which should be
immediately demolished are those which
present a public safety problem or are in danger
of falling on neighboring structures. In most
cases, severely damaged buildings were able to
be shored up or fenced off to eliminate any
hazard. The three commercial buildings which
were demolished were taken down within thirty
days of the earthquake because they were
endangering adjacent properties. The bricks
from these buildings were saved to be reused on
the replacement structures. One of the three is
presently being reconstructed and will be sliced
the original brick for use as a veneer on the
front elevation. It seems a disservice to have
FEMA and other agencies push to have buildings
torn down right away, as long as life and safety
can be protected.

DISCREPANCIES IN REPAIR ESTIMATES
Another problem is getting the experts to
agree on what should be done with a
historic
building. As an example, a
commercial building in the downtown was
significantly damaged. Known as the La Canada
Building, it is a landmark located at the corner
of North Santa Cruz Avenue and Main Street.
The owners had six different engineers inspect
the structure before they found one that could
save the building at an economically feasible
price. The original estimate for saving the
building was $6 million. VSL Corporation was
able to retrofit the building for seismic safety
and at the same time preserve the historic value
for about $1 million. Another positive result is
the property owners will now be able to get
insurance for the building (the structural
engineer was able to demonstrate that the
structure will be safe and will meet enough of
the current building code to make it insurable).
A second historic
the Rankin Block,
was
to be demolished and rebuilt. Two
different structural
about
costs of seismic retrofit and restoration
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versus demolition and reconstruction. The
Town Council
denied the demolition
permit, relying on expert information from the
State Office of Historic Preservation's structural
engineer rather than expert information from
the engineer hired by the applicant. It would be
very helpful to get representatives from various
fields to meet to discuss the issues involved in
restoring historic buildings. Historians,
architects, structural engineers, building
inspectors, contractors, bankers, and insurance
companies could each give their own
perspective on historic preservation for the
benefit of the other professionals. More
importantly, the establishment of guidelines
would be easier and they would be more
effective.

LOSSES AND COSTS

The Town of Los Gatos has lost a significant
amount of revenue due to businesses not
reopening or relocating outside the Town, and
waiving of building and planning fees. About
$700,000 was lost in revenues in 1990, which
was more than expected. Expenditures for the
Town were also uncommonly high (about $1.4
million). It is anticipated that for the fiscal year
1991 additional expenditures will be $1.3
million and loss revenues will be $560,000.

City of Oakland29
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

In addition to
on response
of mutual
Oakland supports the
concept of developing mutual aid
ur.,,,m,Pnt<: with cities and counties in different
areas of the state that are unlikely to be
impacted by the same disaster. For example, the
City of Oakland could develop a mutual aid
agreement with the City of Long Beach. These
cities are similar in population, demographics,
and available resources. Under the agreements,
the cities in the unaffected areas would assist
their "sister cities" in the affected areas in the
event of a disaster.
While the Emergency Management
Operational Area concept, which identifies
counties as operational areas, is an appropriate
management system for cities which are without
full-time emergency services departments, it is
not an effective or appropriate system for large
cities (population over 300,000). In the case of
Oakland, the City has a full-time Office of
Emergency Services, and it is not practical to
work through Alameda County Sheriff's
Department (which employs two coordinators
to manage the County's OES and coordinate
response for 14 cities). It would be more
appropriate for Oakland, perhaps in
conjunction with Emeryville, Alameda, and
""'·lu>IPv to be considered a separate operational
area.
The current
developed by FEMA
and State OES for the procurement of federal
resources by a local jurisdiction are cumbersome
and
The current process is if the City
needs a federal resource, it makes the
the County. The County passes the
to the State O.E.S. Regional Office. The
"'"!'"-"'"" Office then forwards the
to
State OES in Sacramento, which
the
to FEMA "'"'""H-'H'H
FEMA "~ 1,,~'""'

categcJric~s

Oakland, Office of
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resource
memorandums of un.derst:an,jintg
between federal and state resources and
un:sol<CtH)ns in which
reside. These MOUs

difficult it was to conduct rumor
the non local media. There was little
control of the network media
the local
local OES offices can establish better

MASS CARE AND SHELTEll

schools as locations for emergency shelters.
Local school districts would be better

RECOVERY

of the center was
more
effort should have
made to address the
""'V"I''H FEMA
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KeJ;tlOJn<U Office reviewers.
due to the
limited FEMA staff,
assigned to
Oakland are often reassigned to other disasters.
This causes delay and confusion while the
assigned representatives become familiar with
Oakland's applications and appeals, frequently
requiring the entire process to begin again.
While FEMA has standard labor rates for
reimbursement, many of these rates are
unrealistically low given the Bay Area's high
cost of living. Although FEMA has recognized
this in principle, inspectors often fail to apply
this principle when preparing damage survey
reports (DSRs) for the City.
Improved coordination between FEMA and
the State OES Disaster Assistance division and
respective regulations would help to ease the
recovery and reimbursement process. On
occasion, FEMA will not recognize State
requirements, such as those imposed by the
State Historical Preservation Office (SHPO),
which makes the evaluation of recovery projects
especially difficult.

PIUVATE ASSISTANCE
Over fifty small businesses in the downtown
area have remained closed since the
Economic injury is estimated at over $20
million, annually. Small Business
Administration (SBA) loans could not
adequately address the problems. In many cases
the businesses have not been able to relocate
and recover. These individuals need •nr•rr-''"n"'
recovery "'"'i"t'.r"'" rather than one-time grants
or loans.
FEMA
income shelters
room occupancy
a result of class action lawsuit filed
Alameda

all those
The cost estimate to replace
low-income housing lost in the earthquake is
almost $27 million. Of the approximately 2,500
Oakland residents made homeless as a result of
the earthquake, 1,500 are still without
permanent shelter. The stock of affordable
housing has decreased significantly, while the
number of shelter beds in Alameda County has
increased by only 100.
In addition, FEMA requires that the entire
settlement amount be expended within one year
of the settlement which is an unrealistically
short period for developing an effective program
and conducting the rehabilitation work.
Amending the FEMA requirements for residents
of low income housing, to include SROs will
better facilitate the assistance to those
individuals and avoid litigation.

CALIFORNIA DISASTER ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM (CALDAP)
While the CALDAP program provides
financial assistance to repair or replace owneroccupied housing, and to complete other
necessary repairs to bring a home into
compliance with local code requirements, the
program was unable to assist commercial
property owners with repairs. Commercial
establishments in Oakland, many of which
house
room occupancy units for lowincome
are !eft with no means to
finance rehabilitation work.
it has
been
difficult for the City to rebuild
its low-income housing units, 95 percent of
which were
the earthquake.
An amendment to
or a revision of
"-J<.•.uuuvu->, may need to be enacted in
order for commercial
HHA'-'>-U<>'C residential COmmercial nrrH"tPTtU
in the program.
rental
owners have
program, which
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assistance in a timely manner. Because the
program requires evidence that borrowers have
sought financing from other disaster assistance
programs, such as FEMA, many have waited
over a year for a response from CALDAP-R.
It is recommended that the State review and
revise the requirements for CALDAP-R to ensure
that assistance can be provided in a timely
manner.

local jux:isdictions to provide documentation on
the economic effects. In addition, cities and
counties affected by the Lorna Prieta earthquake
are meeting regularly to discuss, among other
issues, the strategy for accessing this legislation.
Local representatives have met with members of
Congress to lobby for the implementation of
this legislation. Oakland encourages the State to
pressure the Federal government to implement
this legislation.

RECOVERY LEGISLATION
PREPAREDNESS
1. 1/4 Cent Sales Tax for Earthquake Recovery

(Assemblyman Rusty Areias).
While this special legislation was successful
in generating almost $800 million in revenue,
this amount cannot adequately address the
recovery needs of the affected area. Given the
State budget deficit, and the mood of the
California electorate, recommending a
permanent sales tax increase for earthquake
recovery, mitigation, and preparedness may not
be appropriate at this time. However, the City of
Oakland would advocate that a lesser fraction
sales tax increase, perhaps 1/16 of a cent, be
enacted at a later date.
2. Economic Recovery Provision of the 1974
Disaster Assistance Act (Public Law 930288,
Title V)
This legislation makes available, through the
U.S. Department of Commerce, a maximum of
$250 million to jurisdictions which experience
negative long-term economic effects as a result
of a disaster. Because the Economic Recovery
Provision has never before been implemented,
activating it has proven to be very difficult.
FEMA attorneys originally contended that this
legislation did not exist. San Francisco City
Attorney's Office was successful in determining
its existence.
In August 1990, Mayor Art Agnos of San
Francisco requested that former Governor
George Deukmejian recommend the
implementation of this
former Governor did not "'~·vvuu
both the State Office of .t.rrterj~ertcy ,.,,...,;,...ne

Volunteers. The Lorna Prieta earthquake
revealed that volunteers can be a very valuable
resource. Citizens selflessly assisted with
response and recovery efforts at the collapsed
Cypress structure in Oakland, in San Francisco's
Marina District, and in other affected areas.
Because it is known that volunteers will respond
to subsequent disasters, it is in the City's best
interest to train these residents in disaster
response to make them an even more valuable
resource.
To this end, Oakland has developed a threemodule training program, entitled CORECitizens of Oakland Respond to Emergencies.
Under this program, Oakland residents are
trained in Individual and Family Survival
(Module 1), Organizing Volunteer Response
Teams (Module 2), and Advanced Citizen
Response, Basic First Aid, Fire Suppression, and
Light Search and Rescue (Module 3).
Although the City of Oakland has dedicated
the resources to support the program, and OES
personnel have provided the training, the City
requests that the State help to provide the
funding to equip the volunteer groups with the
necessary supplies for earthquake response.
The State may consider following up on the
Natural Disaster Volunteer Corps Program (AB
which
the State Office of
for state
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of

with other
cities in
numbers of URM

Services to
program.

and administer the

the California
regional
provide adequate training to emergency services
personnel.

MITIGATION

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.
Within strict dollar limits, the Stafford Act
provides that the federal government will fund
50 percent of approved hazard mitigation
projects for jurisdictions in disaster declared
areas. Local government and other applicants
are responsible for providing the SO percent
match. The amount expected to be available
under the Lorna Prieta earthquake for hazard
mitigation grants is approximately $30 million.
While this grant program provides some
assistance in the area of hazard mitigation, it is
far from adequate.
Oakland recommends that the State develop
its own Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. In
addition to providing funding in the area of
hazard mitigation, the State's program would
focus on priorities identified by the State of
California, many of which are ineligible under
the federal program.

County
Francisco3o

San

Nine of the eleven deaths in San Francisco
attributed to the Lorna Prieta earthquake
resulted from partially collapsed or severely
damaged buildings. Many of the injuries and
economic impacts of the earthquake are also
directly related to building damage and there
are lasting social and economic effects. The loss
of housing, particularly housing for those with
low and moderate incomes, has exacerbated an
existing shortage of residential units. The costs
of repairing and rebuilding damaged private and
public buildings, and improving both damaged
and undamaged buildings so that they will
survive future (and larger) earthquakes, is too
large to be borne locally.
The following discussion of San Francisco's
experience since the Lorna Prieta earthquake is
organized into the general types of activities
undertaken by government as a result of this
earthquake: Life Safety (fire suppression and
search and rescue); Building Safety (immediate
inspection and posting of structures);
Information Management; Shelter and
Temporary Housing; Recovery (the Individual
Assistance Program and the Public Assistance
Program); and Hazard Mitigation. It
concentrates on the activities in which there is a
substantial State, or shared local/State/federal
30 Submitted by the City and County of San
Francisco, Department of City Planning.
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responsibility, and on those activities where
experience uncovered shortfalls of resources,
inadequate preparation, or lack of coordination.
In each section a short discussion of the events
following the Lorna Prieta earthquake and an
identification of problems which occurred
precedes the general recommendations for
future State actions and policies.
San Francisco's Lorna Prieta experience shows
that the design and management of recovery
programs should be as simple as possible.
Problems arose when programs were complex
and numerous, and when many different
agencies and levels of government were
involved. The needs of victims could be better
and more efficiently served if programs could be
administered closer to the local level and with
considerable local involvement.
The local involvement that San Francisco
recommends should be part of a comprehensive
preparedness and response program tailored to
local needs. The National Earthquake Hazards
Reduction Act includes "hazard identification,
vulnerability assessments, preparedness and
response planning, mitigation planning and
public awareness/education" among the eligibie
activities which it will fund (on a cost-sharing
basis). Because the Act treats "local units of
government and or substate areas that include a
number of local government jurisdictions" as
definitionally equivalent to State agencies, we
believe that this program could directly fund
these local efforts, in addition to its funding for
State agencies. In order to avoid the problems of
excessive and duplicative documentation
requirements and interagency procedures, this
funding should be provided as a "block grant."
It should be conditioned on the operation of an
effective and efficient overall
preparedness program, rather than on the
examination of each small piece of the program
against very
standards.
This is not to say, however, that there should
be less State involvement in
and
recovery
disasters. The State of ,._,a.!wuH
should, in co<)P~!raltlOl
design programs and
which could be
lmpl~!m,emtea on the local level and train local

staff. For example, OES is better prepared than
most localities to design a model citizen
volunteer training program, which could be
used by cities and counties.
Part of the State-level program should be the
development of standards to be met by local
agencies participating in disaster recovery, in
order to assure that localities are well prepared
to carry out the responsibilities that we have
advocated they be given. These could include
standards for and oversight of local
preparedness plans and organizations,
mitigation programs, and postdisaster
administrative structures.
Finally, many State programs were instituted
in response to the Lorna Prieta earthquake, and
are being funded by the temporary sales tax
increase. The State, as well as local governments,
should have legislation in place, including
programs and revenue sources, which could
automatically take effect or easily be enacted in
response to an emergency. For example, after a
declared emergency when damage estimates
exceed some predetermined level (perhaps $500
million) a temporary sales tax increase could
occur automatically.

LIFE SAFETY
Immediately following the Lorna Prieta
earthquake, emergency response was
by municipal response organizations, and
primarily by the San Francisco Fire Department.
The Fire Department responded to 34 fires
between 5:04 p.m. on October 17 through
midnight on October 19. All resulted
or
indirectly from the
The Fire
with the help of citizen "nlnr1tPPr~
.:u;~"~~cu in search and rescue efforts where
had
The Fire
response to fires and collapsed ~~"~""'"J
""'-'"'"'U.L.:. to standard

and

processes,
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as well as within FEMA's Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program administered by OES.
Fire Department staff also identified some
areas in which state or regionwide planning and
coordination could improve response. Fire,
Police, and Emergency Medical Services staff are
well trained to carry out their emergency
functions. However, in a major disaster a much
larger pool of people trained in fire suppression,
first aid, simple search and rescue, and building
safety than is currently available will be needed.
It should include both nonemergency city staff
and citizen volunteers, and be able to work
under firefighters' direction or independently.
Many neighborhood groups have expressed
interest in being trained in emergency response.
The Fire Department has begun a training
program which involves fifteen hours of
training. The department trained 24 citizen
volunteers in its first year. Clearly, larger scale
effort is needed, but is currently beyond
available local resources.
The State is currently developing a program
to assist local governments develop civilian
volunteer training. The
as part of its
responsibility for education and information
should
the
establishment of local citizen volunteer
programs. This could include funding local
training programs, providing manuals and
teaching materials to local agencies, training the
local trainers, providing equipment to citizen
volunteers, perhaps including a training session
for citizen volunteers by the California
Specialized Training Institute.
In some cases, essential City staff, including
emergency responders, were unable to travel
into the City immediately after the earthquake.
Had the Golden Gate Bridge been out of service,
this would have been a much more severe
problem. The State should facilitate an
intraregional system, including local
governments and public and private
transportation providers, to immediately
transport essential personnel to and from
predetermined points after a major disaster.

BUILDING SAFETY
The Bureau of Building Inspection (BBI) was
responsible for the categorization of damaged
buildings, and for immediate decisions about
the safety of damaged buildings. BBI, with the
help of volunteer inspectors, used the Applied
Technology Council's ATC-20 system to classify
buildings as "red" (unsafe), "yellow" (limited
entry), and "green" (no restriction on use or
occupancy). Over 18,000 inspections were
performed after the earthquake.
As of a month after the earthquake, 234
buildings had been red tagged. Fifty-five of these
buildings had already been removed from this
category by being demolished, secured, repaired,
or reinspected and recategorized.
By August 1990, ten months after the
369 buildings had been red-tagged,
and seven remained in that category. Fifty-one
buildings which had been identified by the
Bureau of Building Inspection (BBI) as unsafe
had been demolished. Thirty-five of the fiftyone demolished red-tagged buildings were
residential buildings, containing a total of 512
units.
buildings are currently
'-'""'l'.'Ju<c'-u as "secured" (this term is not part of
the ATC-20 system). Secured buildings are
unoccupiable. Of these 78 buildings, 51 contain
residential units, with a total of 591 units. Thus,
over 1,100 residential units have been removed
from use by demolition or securing.
Approximately 1650 buildings, including
about 730 residential buildings, were yellowtagged after the earthquake (this includes about
90 buildings which had been red-tagged and
reclassified to yellow, and are among the 369
buildings discussed above). Very few of these
buildings have been demolished. (fo put these
figures in context, there are about 120,000
buildings in San Francisco. About 1.6o/o of the
total building stock was at some point yellowtagged or red-tagged.)
Many other buildings sustained nonstructural
damage such as cracked plaster and broken
glass, and were not classified red or yellow. The
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residential units lost or unavailable for extended
had housed low and moderate income
including several
hotels. Because of the
of low-cost
in a long-term social impact, and was one of the
of the
on San
Francisco.
BBI identified several deficiencies in the ATC20 system and developed some new categories
in addition to the red, yellow and green
categories set out by ATC-20. These observed
problems should be given the highest
of
consideration in OES's current evaluation of the
program. San Francisco's BBI developed a new
category, "Secured," that is
used for
buildings which do not create a hazard to
adjoining structures or to any street or public
way, but which are unsafe for occupancy or use.
A building classified "Secured" is tagged neither
red nor yellow. Examples of secured buildings
are those where work under a
has been
to shore up,
demolish or otherwise secure the
when it's source of

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
officials were confronted with enormous
demands for information from the
the
estimates of
and
displaced people were needed for response and
recovery efforts. The City had little data
capability.
The State of California should address this
problem by
develop standard
having available standby
prc>gram.mt~o to handle disaster data, and
training local agencies in ror,,-,.rhn
before a disaster.

SHELTER AND TEMPORARY HOUSING
ASSISTANCE

of a sequence of detailed 1m;pect1ons,
with buildings moving
exclusive
of red to
to green.
The State OES assisted San Francisco
volunteer inspectors from outside of
While the volunteers themselves were

resources, some who lived in
occupancy
and some with
substance abuse or mental health

enough necessary coordination for their
food,
In future disasters
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un_;v,,_u

need in urban
areas, and
this service in local
assistance programs. An ad hoc referral
the
and the Red Cross
to
program,
would have better been able to meet the needs
for whom the
uuu"•uJ<.

grim situation.
The temporary
assistance program is
intended to provide "suitable"
housing until suitable
housing is
available. Because the determinations of what
constituted "suitable"
who was
entitled to
assistance, and how the
program should be administered were made
persons
limited
of
the San Francisco
Francisco resident
how to handle many persons that were
displaced
the
were made. FEMA
established a $950
rental allowance for
of
all households, regardless of size or of
housing needed. Larger families found it
impossible to find
in San
Francisco at this rent. Federal ... .,.,,,,.,,~J
unwilling to maintain any
programs. For
to
fund furniture
costs, even when it
resulted in a cost of less than $950 for
a
""'~''-'"'""~ household.
.. ~~J'"" assistance program
consisted
of subsidies to be used in
rental market. In a

program would include local ~o·vernn1ertt
"l'-'ClH~!c:>, and
and
providers.
The federal legislation and regulations
the
housing assistance
program specifically authorize states, and
through the states, local jurisdictions, to take
over substantial administrative responsibilities.
(44 CFR 206.101(s)). A state requesting such
authority "must have an approved plan prior to
the incident [and] must comply with FEMA
program regulations and
" It also
nrt>VH1P"' for funds for technical assistance to
states to make this
The State should
pursue this avenue. Local
could much more
implement
programs because their staffs
with local conditions
tmm{~Ql;nery available.

RECOVERY

Small Business Administration (SBA), the
of
and others. The
administration of some of these programs,
the
and disbursement
prcx:e,dm:es, is
by those federal
Other federal programs are

State programs are
rather than
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the

considerable expense.
""'nl•""''"" and officials became

HH.UU.'O

an

effective administrative structure which
the
for sp<::cnK pv'"'~"~""''~"
were
who were unaware of or frustrated
This involvement was made the
more difficult because San Francisco had had no
experience or preparation in dealing with
federal disaster response. When the
of this task became dear, the City hired one fullexperienced federal recovery
to
train and coordinate other
staff who were
to be involved in federal and State programs.
About twenty City staff people devoted full time
to these programs for about nine months. The
Public Assistance Program reimbursements for
these administrative costs did not cover the
City's expenses.
City and County agencies, if adequately
prepared, would have been better able to
administer recovery programs and respond to
local recovery needs. They have knowledge of
and interest in local conditions and local
culture, and motivation to achieve recovery.
Because they are familiar with the area, and are
on hand during and immediately after a
disaster, they will likely have a better
understanding of evolving disaster conditions.
Active local involvement could have avoided
some duplication of effort between those
administering different programs. As an
example of this kind of duplication, federal
employees administering the SBA loan program
had to inspect buildings to confirm that they
had been damaged or destroyed. That

and response
described in the first section of this

INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY GRANT
PROGRAM

is intended to nr.'"H11ir1P
""'o'''""'""'-' grants and loans to renters,
homeowners and businesses whose homes,
buildings or personal property were lost or
damaged. At least six different programs, with
different points of contact, were operating in
San Francisco after the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
The time involved for individuals applying
for individual assistance was sometimes
excessive because of the large number of
different agencies and regulations involved and
their general lack of flexibility. For example,
because of confusion about the scope of the
authority and responsibility between OES,
FEMA, HUD and the Department of
Transportation, it took nine months to
determine whether expenditures to repair a
possible landslide affecting private homes,
public land and streets were eligible for
reimbursement, and by what agency. This delay
Prr.rrr:>Yn
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resulted in substantial hardship and costs to
u:~tu<:ul"• and to the federal government which
was funding temporary housing for these
displaced residents. They are still displaced at
the time of this writing-a year and a half after
the earthquake.
Even in simpler situations, the time of
victims and of those administering the programs
was often wasted by lack of coordination
between state and federal agencies. For
the California Natural Disaster Assistance
Program (CALDAP) was available only to those
who had been denied federal aid. Even if it was
dear that federal assistance would not be
available, victims were required to go through
the application process in order to be formally
denied, a process which in some cases took up
to six months, and which discouraged
applicants. Separate damage inspections were
required by the state program. Because these
inspectors were more familiar with local code
requirements and labor and material costs, this
additional inspection often resulted in
damage assessments, and strengthened some
applicants' cases. But these additional
inspections could only occur months after the
federal inspections. Delegation of the initial
inspection responsibility to localities would
have saved time and money, for both the
and for earthquake victims. If the
was approved after local
release of funds
the State
Controller could add two months to the process.
Although local screening of possible
applicants
that about 500 were
potentially
only 182 actually applied for
the CALDAP program, suggesting a high
of
among victims. The total
value of these loan
was about $23.9
million.
no state loans had been
funded under this program,
pr<Xt~ssing and recommendations for
of a number of "'"''"'H''-'"'v'
1, 1991

14

The federal lack of familiarity with local
conditions was reflected in a lack of recognition
of the high cost of building in San Francisco by
SBA inspectors, and of necessary related costs,
such as required code work. Consequently,
many of the approved loan applications were
approved at dollar values well below the
amounts applied for, based on unreasonably low
federal cost estimates. The process for
these determinations was lengthy. This forced
applicants to apply to the CALDAP program as
which had more realistic cost estimates, as
a de facto "appeals process."
The Mayor's Office of Housing conducted a
survey of thirty owners of "red-tagged"
multifamily properties in the Marina. Only one
of these owners felt satisfied with the amount,
terms, and timeliness of their approved loan.
The remainder had often strong negative
comments regarding the frustrations and
of the experience. Several had been forced to sell
property at a loss due to lenders' or investors'
pressures, only to find out weeks later they had
been given SBA approval. Frustration with the
federal programs was so high that the U.S.
Representative for the district had to assist over
200 constituents through the process. The terms
and bureaucratic approval process were
sufficiently discouraging that several persons
contacted said their decision not to apply for
the state loan (which might have been more
beneficial) was based on "disbelief that
could ever expect any genuine help from any
government entity."
Many of the multifamily rental properties in
San Francisco had a higher
value
than the maximum federal loan amount of
$500,000. The average multifamily
that
""''"r,plv damaged in the Marina contained
with a

maximum
amounts,
had to apply to and
SBA in order to
to the
CALDAP program.
While the State program included
such as
interest and

'-H'"''vn.
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lost low-income
the federal
programs did not. Of the over 350 units in the
survey in the
10 percent had,
to the
been rented at very-lowincome levels. Many
owners expressed
a concern that they could notre-rent units at
those rates,
the terms of the federal loan
program, but would have been willing to if there
had been sufficient incentives. Most of the units
lost in the Marina District were rental
and
all the replacement units will be condominiums
in order to repay conventional or SBA loans.
Theretore, federal recovery policy has
led to the de facto conversion of hundreds of
rental units, many of which rented at low- and
moderate-income
to
condominiums. This result is
to the
of the
of Housing and Urban
under nonemergency
the '-''-Hl~,rc,~"
intended those
disaster to receive
housing until suitable
and it intended that
u~~J•u,_be

determine whether those in need of assistance
actually received the assistance they needed. A
locally run program to match victims with
resources,
using a caseworkers
"'>'lf''V'"'-'"' in which each disaster victim needs
to deal with one government contact rather
than
could be more effective and
efficient than the current
and distant

PUBUC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Public facilities in San Francisco were also
the earthquake. The City estimates
facilities at
''-""'"''"~ about $60 million
buildings, $19 million u•aaa~;'
$15 million ~"'H"t>~
'""'""'""' and $21 million ...."'"'~"'
School District facilities. About $14 million will
facilities of .. ~ .. ,."~u
for the Public Assistance
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the Public Assistance p,.,-,ar,,m
Administration of the federal Public
Assistance Program could be considerably
simplified by changing the character of the
program from one of reimbursement for
exhaustively detailed expenses, to one that
distributes "block grants" to local agencies. State
and federal agencies could establish granting
criteria which measure the magnitude of a
disaster (which affects the ability of an area to
recover) and the estimated damage. Assistance
could occur quickly and without a detailed
application process. Local governments could
establish their own priorities for short-term and
long-term recovery assistance and then make a
full accounting of expenditures.

HAZARD MITIGATION

The State of California could promote seismic
safety in housing in several ways. Existing state
and federal programs to assist owners of lowincome or multifamily buildings undertaking
building code-required repairs such as the
federal Rental Rehabilitation Program, the
California Housing Rehabilitation Program and
the California Rental Rehabilitation Program
should be expanded to include voluntary
seismic upgrading. These programs generally
contain per-unit spending caps and restrict
spending to code-required improvements.
Publicly subsidized housing rehabilitation
projects should, as a matter of policy, encourage
or even require funding for seismic
work,
rather than discouraging it. The recent voterapproved statewide bond issue for seismic
rehabilitation work is an example of a
policy toward mitigation.
it will not
be sufficient to meet the needs for seismic
'"''v'""'"'·"· Once this bond
is
be a disincentive for the
residential

San Francisco have not been
or
""''u'"'li"uc•u, and the evidence is that the costs
that the owners may
Recent
to state
law make it easier for the
to institute
receivership of damaged abandoned buildings,
but such laws do not provide for the necessary
construction or take-out financing. Current state
law which authorizes court receivership for
unreinforced masonry buildings which are not
brought up to requirements should be expanded
to cover postdisaster abandoned buildings.
An earthquake presents an opportunity for
research which could inform future mitigation
efforts statewide. San Francisco took advantage
of this. For example, the damage and damage
patterns of all of the City's unreinforced
masonry buildings was investigated after the
earthquake. Although it may not have been
explicitly intended, OES made this possible by
supplying volunteer engineers and inspectors. In
future disasters, the state should recognize this
opportunity and encourage and publicize such
efforts. Rebuilding also presents an important
research opportunity. Repaired buildings should
be monitored and have instruments installed to
measure their response to future earthquakes.
Particularly since some rebuilt and repaired
buildings use new engineering techniques,
important information could be derived from a
systematic research effort. This could best be
coordinated at the State level as part of the
Seismic Motion Instrumentation Program. As
part of this effort, the State should conduct
detailed debriefings to collect information about
how local agencies handled the problems they
encountered. This information should then be
passed on to others.

SUMMARY

To summarize the issues explored above, we
believe that the State should encourage a
"'"'"'"'u"''" and response
program tailored to local needs. It should
include hazard
vulnerability
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programs and

which could be
on the local level. The State
program should include
and
standards in order to assure that localities are
well prepared to carry out their

uv~J,,ur.

referral
for
should be established. It should be ,...,.,,.,.,.~,r~
with the

Life Safety. The State is currently
developing a program to assist local
governments develop civilian volunteer
training. The State should promote the
establishment of local citizen volunteer training
programs. This could include funding local
programs, providing materials, training the local
trainers, providing equipment to volunteers,
perhaps including a in-situ training session for
citizen volunteers by the California Specialized
Training Institute. Topics could include fire
suppression, first aid, search and rescue,
building safety.
The State should facilitate an intraregional
system, including local governments and public
and private transportation providers, to
immediately transport essential personnel to
and from predetermined points after a major
disaster.

Building Safety. The deficiencies in the
ATC-20 system observed in San Francisco should
be considered in OES's current evaluation of the
ATC-20 program. For example the current
procedures lack a category for buildings which
do not create a hazard to adjoining structures or
to any street or public way, but which are unsafe
for occupancy or use, or for buildings which do
not present an immediate hazard and can be
occupied, but which require repairs.
When outside volunteers are used, each
group of volunteers organized by OES should
have a "group leader" to provide
and
organizational support.
Information Management. The State
should work with local agencies to ,;,,.,,'""
standard reporting systems, perhaps including

groups.
The State should develop a temporary
housing plan and encourage local
administration of the Temporary Housing
Assistance Program as provided by federal
regulations.

Recovery. A program to prepare for local
involvement in the postdisaster administration
of both the Individual and Family Grant
Program and the Public Assistance Program, as
well as other recovery activities needs to be
established. The State should assist local
agencies in determining an effective postdisaster
administrative structure. The State should
provide an ongoing program of training in the
requirements of state and federal programs.
Local administration of this program should be
part of a comprehensive preparedness and
response program tailored to local needs. Part of
the State-level program could be the
development of standards to be met by local
agencies, perhaps including standards for and
oversight of local preparedness plans, mitigation
programs, and postdisaster administrative
structures. Postdisaster funding should be
provided as a "block grant" conditioned only on
the operation of an effective and efficient
overall earthquake preparedness and recovery
program.
The State should enact a temporary sales tax
increase which could automatically take effect
when damage estimates exceed some
predetermined level during a declared
emergency.
The State should better coordinate the
California Natural Disaster Assistance vrr•ur:nn
and federal assistance. Duplicate damage
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the Lorna Prieta
1990.
Information about local
such as
code
and building costs, should be
into recovery programs.
The State should nrr>Vi(1P

of
1990.
v<tH(!;[l(>Jcl,

to match victims with resources,
caseworker
in which each disaster
victim needs deal with one
contact.

rehabilitation programs to assist owners
of low-income or

uvu:>1ux

seismic up,!>""-"'''5·
Current state law

Tom
Office of
interview, November
1990.
Laurence
Chief
interview, November
1990.

San Francisco
1990.
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t'\P1'<!rl'nr1PI had been
roles in
and
this
1989, less than 30
minutes after the n.,,,,,,.,,.., the EOC was in
full operation at Fire Station #2 on the east side
of the
One reason for this
response was
Three years
Santa Cruz had
been threatened
a flood on the San Lorenzo
the EOC was activated.
on the orange
Critical
vests which denote their roles: "Incident
" "Public Information
etc.
the river did not
but
staff
"v'""'''"r'roon a drill that was colored
of a real emergency.
retro:;pect, it is very clear that
the Incident Command System,
'"'"'xuu'~ responsibility,
physically
familiar with the
and
the roles
would
were aU
in the City's effective
emergency response to the Lorna Prieta
We believe that such drills are a
success and they should be scheduled on a
basis.

THE BEGINNING OF TRANSITION

were directed from the EOC at Fire Station #2.
this time,
aftershocks had
the
threat to life was no
and the
of the
area had been
secured by a chain-link fence. It became dear
a new
center should be
established at the site of the

imm{~di:ately '""''"""'''i' to the devastated area;
this would be the administrative center of
recovery activities for the next eight weeks.
As a result of this experience, the City of
Santa Cruz has made planning for several
of recovery part of its emergency response
program. The specific profile of calamitous
flood,
never be
But Lorna Prieta demonstrated that
in many disasters, the recovery
may
extend for weeks, months, or even years.
nu~u'"'"';.;.u most California cities and counties
have emergency response programs, few have
ucvc•cvu•cu plans for managing recovery. Setting
up both general guidelines and some form of
administrative structure for this activity can
smooth the transition from the emergency
response to the initial recovery phase.

PAC-OPS AND BEYOND
The Pacific Garden Mall was-and is--the
commercial heart of Santa Cruz. Before the
600 businesses
in the
downtown area. After 34 commercial u-.uuu<<S"
were demolished and an additional 375,000
square feet of commercial space was damaged,
206 businesses had been destroyed or dislocated.
In the second week after the earthquake,
and unexpected demands emerged.
Business
needed to
access to cash
rPon~t.Pn: and vaults. Lawyers and other
IJllJl<=:>:uvua'" needed to retrieve files and other
documents. Businesses needed to remove
undamaged
Residents needed to
access to
hundreds of decisions
The many

from the emergency response
of HH<U~',I',H
The

office trailers were

of
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control for

RISING UKE THE PHOENIX
before

R"'""''""''"'' for them was contingent on
undamaged inventory and then ""''-'L"J;
temporary location in which to
Getting
the businesses in and out of the devastated area
was a logistical challenge. Working with the
Chamber of Commerce and the Downtown
Association, Pac-Ops orchestrated a safe, orderly
and effective inventory retrieval program. The
participation of these groups was absolutely
necessary to carry out this phase of the recovery
effort. The Chamber of Commerce and the
Downtown Association had the home phone
numbers of business owners and managers.
They had the people and the know-how to
reach business owners to schedule inventory
retrieval and other legitimate trips into the
damaged area. They also had the trust of their
fellow business people and often knew them
personally.
Carrying out this program wasn't easy.
Communication was essential. Business people
were willing to wait their turn to have access to

monitors and o"'''"''"
destruction was concentrated in the downtown
commercial area of Santa
numbers of residential units also suffered
"'"'''-'·"staffed an outreach
program to inform these owners that federal
disaster aid was available to them. All of these
functions were needed
various stages of
recovery.
should be included in emergency
response
Within three weeks of the earthquake,
tPrnnnr;•rv tent structures--the Phoenix
vu.<u''"-~""''"' been erected downtown. These
'"u'v"'"'""' businesses could use
season. City
""''""nnn,<>l worked with the business community
this enormous task. Staffing for
this activity was critical to the recovery process;
such needs should be anticipated in emergency
planning.
Based on this experience, it's important to
adjust personnel to the tasks that must be
accomplished during this phase of recovery. It is
critical that the local government understand
the point of view of businesses which have been
disrupted by a disaster. Operations cannot be
carried out in a bureaucratic, "business as usual"
fashion; risks must be taken. A flexible system is
required that involves the stakeholders in a real
way and public/private cooperation is absolutely
essential.
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LONG-RANGE RECOVERY

Ap>pn:>Xim<tte.!y two months after the
earthquake, Pac-Ops was reduced in size and
moved. By this time, the Mall area was
subdivided into those streets and buildings that
were open, and those which were secured by
fences, pending financial/planning decisions
and/or rebuilding. A skeleton crew in one trailer
would continue to provide controlled access and
supervision of the area for another eight
months.
The City Council appointed a 36-member
citizen group- Vision Santa Cruz-to develop an
overall concept for rebuilding the downtown
about two months after the earthquake. This
process is still continuing. Consultants have
been hired to create a downtown/streetscape
plan based upon the general principles
developed by Vision Santa Cruz. The City
Council will adopt a version of this plan and
rebuilding of the downtown will enter its final
phase.
Since the earthquake, however, the City has
approved several projects during the interim
recovery period. It was clear that overall
planning would take a year or better, and if
property owners wanted to begin sooner, they
should be encouraged. Thus the City Council
adopted an interim policy which allowed
owners to rebuild if they submitted projects that
were essentially the same size and use as their
prequake structures. If they wanted to build
something significantly larger or different,
would need to wait for development of the
downtown plan.
This approach provided a reasonable amount
of flexibility. Ten
have been
At "·-~- ... ,
under these emergency
one has been constructed. This illustrates

of
have remained in limbo
over a year. Because of cost and'-",""'~'-"'''~'>
some owners wanted to demolish these
structures and rebuild. Historic or~:sel:vanomsts

wanted to save them. In one case, the issue went
to court. These
were threats to public
thus they were surrounded by chain-link
fencing. Structures adjacent to them--or within
a safety area that was defined if they should
fall-were also left in limbo. Basically, several
blocks in the downtown remained paralyzed
because of the unresolved issues these buildings
presented.
This was especially trying for the owners and
employees of adjacent structures which could
have been repaired were it not for the delay in
resolving the status of the historic buildings.
This in turn affected the willingness of financial
institutions to lend money. Other owners in the
downtown were reluctant to blaze the trail and
rebuild before all the fences had been removed
from the area and fult traffic flow was restored
to Pacific Avenue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon these experiences--particularly in
the postemergency phases of recovery-the City
of Santa Cruz has some recommendations
concerning both regulations and delivery of
state aid to communities which have suffered
major disasters.
The Mayor and City Manager of Santa Cruz,
the Redevelopment
and the Executive
Director of the Chamber of Commerce all
testified at a meeting of the Seismic Safety
Commission on October 11, 1990. Their
highlighted three areas in which
and aid
could be imnr'"'~·rl

over
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Avenue. The
intent of SB 3X is
unclear. The City of Santa Cruz recommends
that the legislation be amended to define a
specific process local jurisdictions must follow
before historic buildings may be demolished
after a disaster. When such structures present a
threat to life and/or a threat to adjacent
property, decisions concerning their disposition
must be left to local government. The process
allowing this action must be made very clear so
that there is no ambiguity nor cause for legal
challenges. The existing path-which the city
suffered through under current SB 3X-would
cause difficulties to potentially every other city
in the state in the event of another major
earthquake.
A second area for improvement is
redevelopment legislation. The City of Santa
Cruz was well served by passage of SB 39X. This
bill enabled the City to reconstitute its
redevelopment area to develop tax increments
after assessed valuations had been reduced
drastically because of earthquake damage.
Although this legislation allows the City to
recapture tax increment revenues to pay for
recovery projects, it took eight months for the
bill to be processed and signed by the Governor.
The City of Santa Cruz recommends that some
basic boilerplate redevelopment legislation
either be written and ready for adoption in an
emergency, or be adopted in a generic sense and
ready for modification. Thus other communities
facing the same kinds of fiscal recovery for
redevelopment projects would be saved
approximately six months delay because
enabling legislation would already be in
The third area for improvement is the
concept of emergency relief fundingparticularly for earthquake relief. The federal
government operates this program through
FEMA. The premise of emergency aid is to
"replace in kind" what was lost. From an
accounting point of view, it is to replace the
value of what was lost. In a case such as Santa
Cruz, where an earthquake wipes out an entire
commercial center (including underground
facilities damage), additional aid for reasonable
"betterment" needs to be available. This may be

a
initiative that California could
undertake to fill this gap.
For example, the City of Santa Cruz didn't
have a legitimate storm drain system
downtown-many patchwork systems had been
put together over a period of a hundred years.
The City can't rebuild the downtown without
installing a new storm drain system all at once.
The current emergency funding system will not
pick up these betterment costs. The City
suggests that some kind of loan program be
established by the State and made available to
local governments to pay for these kinds of
recovery costs. These loans would be repaid to
the State, but they would relieve the cash flow
difficulties which devastated communities
experience in the first months and years after a
major earthquake.

SUMMARY
The Incident Command System worked
extremely well for the City of Santa Cruz in
responding to the Lorna Prieta earthquake.
Having roles clearly defined, and practicing with
the system, helped the City react effectively
during the emergency phase of the disaster.
However, Lorna Prieta demonstrated that
planning for subsequent phases of recovery
should be part of each local government's
emergency response program.
Since no plan can anticipate all that needs to
be done in a disaster, it is important to have a
flexible and creative response system.
Particularly after an earthquake, planning will
be an ongoing activity. It must involve the
stakeholders in a meaningful way. Public/private
sector cooperation is absolutely essential.
During recovery from the Lorna Prieta
earthquake, Santa Cruz averted political and
economic discord by being open and responsive.
The City restructured its Incident Command
System in midstream and it shared planning
and implementation responsibilities with
business representatives and volunteers. This
approach enabled the City to provide security
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uaul<>~~''-' area while
and recovery program.
on:he:strating a
AU of these activities will he needed to
recover from the
of a
1at.uuu5 for them is the hest form of insurance.

jJVU'-'"'" underwent revision in response
to new information the
about

The ultimate effectiveness
UU!U«~)'IC Can he eX:I)eCted

HU.UUJlULHtl'j

EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING LOCAL
POLICIES
The effectiveness of local

even over time.
" The institution of both

..

factors

32 Submitted

Department.
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to resnoncl
few surprising events. The
the analysis of what had occurred and
modification of existing policies in response to
new technical information. One
difficulty
in that process is that decision-makers and the
absolute answers to questions such
as: "Is it safe or not? Will any further damage
occur? Will it be damaged again unless I take
certain actions now? Will the County stay out
of litigation if certain actions are taken now?
What's the magnitude of the next big
earthquake likely going to be? Why don't we
require that people engineer for a 7.0 and call
that safe?"

DAMAGE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION
The concept of damage "prevention" is an
inappropriate term since prevention isn't
practical. Instead, the concept of mitigation for
damage reduction should be the standard.
Damage reduction through mitigation can be
effectively achieved by continuing several
activities:
• Education
• Development of earthquake construction
techniques and codes
" Extension of seismic retrofitting
requirements to structures built before
seismic safety codes were enacted
• Identification of areas of high earthquake risk
" Development of policies to mitigate potential
damage to facilities located in high risk areas
Consideration of land development policies
in areas of higher earthquake risk will inevitably
involve stressful debate over the probability of
specific hazards. Similarly, debate over issues
such as nonconforming rights to rebuild in
known high hazard areas will be a recurrent
problem. To help local jurisdictions deal
effectively with these pressures, it is important
for the State to enact legislation which allows
local governing bodies to focus on the long term
benefits provided by policies which mitigate

of risk currently falls on the local!urisolctilon in
land use decisions. Local
need more '"""""·wt
of
and financial
to
encourage them to create locally applicable
measures. This could include
'"'UL'"''"" of
in areas known to be
highly susceptible to failure in significant
seismic events and for which engineering based
mitigation proves impractical or impossible.
Such resources should also include money for
the temporary or permanent relocation of
families, businesses, government and other
infrastructure in order to minimize the extent of
future damage. The County believes that this
might prove less costly than extensive
demolition, damage repair, legal costs, and loss
of economic vitality. Where such relocation
methods prove infeasible (such as in the case of
infrastructure) the State should provide
statutory and financial support to encourage
more traditional engineering-based mitigation
measures, such as seismic retrofitting. Without
such impetus and financial support, it seems
unlikely that local jurisdictions can or will take
the initiative in these times of limited budgets.
If given sufficient tax or other incentives, the
public can move to complete mitigation
measures on its own, particularly if there was a
potential for reduced government support for
recovery where available mitigation measures
have not been undertaken.

REDUCING TIME AND COMPLEXITY OF
COMMUNITY RECOVERY
Local jurisdictions, particularly smaller ones,
have insufficient capacity to unilaterally
respond to the recovery needs of their
community in events with the impact of Lorna
Prieta. After the initial response period
concluded, the enormity of the recovery effort
and the degree to which basic, yet critical,
policy decisions concerning recovery had not
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"

state and federal ;u~t:nL:Ies
recovery of the ~VJ<Auuuun
poJllCH~s should address at least the

•

•
•
•

•

sector
resources within the
response
and recovery
Santa
County was only able to cope with its
and reconstruction workload through the use
of contacted services. There would have been
no effective means of providing
service to the community with the
County workforce. The County developed
the mechanisms to contract for services, such
as determining whether the cost of such an
undertaking would be eligible for state and
federal reimbursement, but initially County
staff was still committed entirely to
earthquake repair efforts. Nonearthquake
permit review essential to economic vitality
of the community had to be deferred for
three months. Had contracting for staff to
perform repair permit review and inspection
not been eligible for federal/state
reimbursement then the County's recovery
would have been unnecessarily delayed and
the impact of the earthquake would have
extended to those sectors of the community
which were otherwise undamaged.
Specific plans for providing consistency with
state or federally mandated hazard
mitigation plans;
Standards for acceptable risk;
Standards for acceptable alteration. of
discretionary land use approval processes;
A state policy outliniDg and defining the
range of local discretion expected to be
exercised in recovery and reconstruction land
use policy;
Criteria for the requirement of stricter than
normal standards in land use and
construction where postearthquake data
justifies their implementation;

reconstruction
"Governments should focus on and formalize
process
want to have in
when the
disaster strikes rather than
tweak or
around or
'"''""'" ... '"""when
to move as
quickly as possible to help your community."
To provide a basis for the effort to balance
individual property rights with the mandate to
public health and safety, local
jurisdictions should be required by the State to
develop community recovery plans with just as
much emphasis, if not more, than is currently
placed on immediate emergency response.
Recovery is a much more complex endeavor
with more dramatic and longer lasting
implications than the immediate response. The
delays and heavy workload involved with the
policy amendment process may have had more
of an effect on community recovery than the
damage which had already occurred. Written
guidance is needed that describes eligible costs
for reimbursement. Had such advice been
available at the time of the earthquake, some of
the confusion, delay, and mistrust could have
been avoided.

City of Watsonville33
COORDINATION BETWEEN FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE
AGENCIES
The coordination of services between
government and community service agencies is
very important. The line of communications

33

Submitted by the City of Watsonville, Office of the
City Manager, in cooperation with the Def.artment of
Recreation and the Office of the Fire Chie .
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must be open from the start of response uuvu;;:.u
to the end of the disaster recovery efforts. In
improvements can be
in the
disaster management network between
state, and local assistance.
The
goals and nn•»T;<Tlnn 1'.'"'-''-AH
for state and federal disaster response
should be reassessed to reflect the true nature
and extent of
caused by large
"'"'ul\.lu.a"'""· Response
should
to
the "real world" when managing a disaster that
touches every part of our service delivery
mission and goals statement for
disaster response agencies should be pr<)m.otl~d.
local ""''"""''"'
roles of the various disaster response
Their services should be directed at ?"'''""'"'~i'"
from the loss of basic life and health
""'~"'·"~".' food and water
the
Most of the ""'"'"'''"
for disaster victims are reflective of
concerns.
with
other basic survival needs are au'<'>'"""~
The
to
multicultural awareness

future.

FEMA RESPONSE

a source of many
the U!::>G.:>l•Cl

'""""'"r'" This

needs to
residents.
costs and availability dictate
c""''""''" necessary from FEMA.
Many Watsonville citizens are still
find a home (15 months after the
FEMA housing support
need to adapt
to local conditions.
u"~"''A" victims should be treated less
andmore
The
""'""''""r"'u needs to be reduced and .>u.uvuuc.u
level). All information needs to be
available in Spanish and other languages, as
received financial assistance
without
the implications. Many
saved the funds and
in tents,
unsure of what next
to take. Other
...~''""'H some nonessential items such as a car,
not
that the check was the last of the
FEMA aid. A dear
of future
and benefits should be explained before a
"'"'~·"'"<"the one-time

service groups. Local
service groups can find
that is suitable
families located closer to their work than
where FEMA located
The local
outreach workers know many of the victims and
to work from.
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and local disaster service groups nr,mTiifiP·fi
very valuable public information.
The FEMA reimbursement rates for housing
assistance and repair costs need to be adapted to
the local economy. The rates used were far
below the local costs of housing and building
repair.
Residents of temporary FEMA housing
(mobile homes) should be dealt with in a more
practical fashion. Each family should be worked
with individually to find new homes. A
cooperative relationship with local housing
assistance groups will help in finding housing
solutions. The long-term housing solutions
require more local involvement with FEMA
service workers. FEMA seemed to distance
themselves from City and County housing
groups.
The FEMA policy on demolition of
earthquake-damaged property needs to be
updated and clarified. The final decision of
whether the cost of demolishing earthquakedamaged housing would be reimbursed wasn't
made until late in the recovery effort; some are
not made yet, over a year after the earthquake.
There were many debates on covering cost of
earthquake damages on some commercial
structures. A FEMA policy on demolition
expense coverage for vacant buildings that were
already in disrepair prior to the earthquake is
also needed.
The assessment of damages to housing was
poorly coordinated between FEMA and local
inspectors. The City had
performed
by professional building inspectors and
structural engineers. FEMA duplicated this
service with their own inspectors. Many times
the damage assessments were different. The
for the
had to be debated between
lSD4~Ct<>r in the field. FEMA
and

'"""u''" as a team coordinated under a
command

This
would
and owners from
mixed
messages between local <1''\Pr+r.rc and FEMA

logistical
could have been
dealt with earlier if the local, state, and federal
agencies had been meeting and planning
together. For example, the disaster assistance
center (DAC) was located on the outskirts of the
City. Transportation to the center was poor. The
City had to organize a special transportation
network from the Red Cross shelters to the
center.
After three months of operating the
emergency shelters, Red Cross and local disaster
service agencies were ready to close. The
coordination between the City and County
service agencies accepting responsibility for the
victims was critical. This exchange required a
good deal of outreach work with disaster victims
located at the shelters. The Red Cross, County,
and City outreach workers teamed together to
provide the information and support to the
shelter residents. For the most part, FEMA
operated on its own. The effort would have
worked much better if all groups would have
approached the problem together. The local
outreach workers could have used their
experience to deal with the special cases, i.e.,
known drug addicts, perpetual homeless, as well
as developmentally disabled. Local outreach
workers are also familiar with the services and
housing stock available for long term solutions
which are most likely to be cost effective.

STATE RESPONSE
The ability to plan and establish a
coordinated command structure is a common
theme to our concern about better services
between state,
and local response
"""'""'-~~J. More planning and
is
vital to this cause. An established planning and
decision-making process should be nPvPiir.r•P"
ties need to be
between the
local service groups and state and federal
The gaps between service groups need
and the
of effort and the
conveyance of mixed messages need to be
eliminated.
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efforts are made. Based on the
of this
earthquake, Watsonville is currently working to
improve the emergency response network. The
following is a summary of these activities.
Watsonville is developing emergency
response agreements between all community
response groups. These groups include City and
County OES, medical clinics, school systems,
utilities (gas, electric, telephone), emergency
shelters, Red Cross, Salvation Army, Food Bank,
religious groups, amateur radio, news media,
Chamber of Commerce, and other community
response agencies who need to develop a
working relationship. We recommend that the
mission of each response group be developed
and charted for group review. Once a dialogue
begins, many groups will surface and fill the
response voids that the response group
identifies. This community response group
needs to include representatives who reflect the
socioeconomic and cultural makeup of the
community so that a variety of service needs are
planned for.
A response network for medical care, shelter,
food supply, health care and resource allocation
is also being developed. The communications
needs, command structure, and service
requirements (supplies, warehouses,
should
be part of a written plan to be approved by an
involved.
The community response team needs
training. Watsonville is planning a town
meeting to replay the Lorna Prieta
Key response players will sit on a panel to
discuss how they will respond. The goal of this
training event is to find weaknesses in the
planning. The training event is highly
publicized to encourage community
involvement and feedback.
will then be scheduled.

••uuuu"" accurate assessments of emergency
response and long-term recovery needs.
Obviously, communication and training are
necessary for the system to function properly.
The ongoing relationship between community
groups needs to be supported by local
government. The specific weaknesses in the
response system need to be targeted and
planned out. The team needs to attain positive
results and train on the system periodically.

Recovery Demands. There are many
challenges for communities recovering from a
major disaster. The logistical, financial and
public information requirements are
tremendous. We must develop systems that
allow communities to bounce back quickly. For
that reason, Watsonville makes the following
recommendations.
Adopt the incident command system and
extend its use and its roles to include the
recovery period. This system has proven to be
an improvement over past models for managing
disaster operations. Responsibility is spread in a
command format that covers all response
challenges. The system allows for
decentralization of the emergency operations
center. The EOC is used as a command post
where the response plan is implemented and
situation status is maintained. Only the disaster
command staff (Emergency Services Director
and lead emergency response team) need to be
present in the EOC. Support staff and branch
leaders can develop their operations at field
~-'"·""v""· The entire response team leadership
should meet on a scheduled basis to update the
response plan.
The recovery response team also needs
'""""'" 5 . Watsonville recommends that OES
ucvc•uLJ courses in
and logistics to
reflect the actual demands of the recovery
FEMA and OES rules and

overlooked in our current
assessment process can be
The
controversial and very difficult to manage. A
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is needed
languages). The
should be universally adopted and
':!."''""''-""persons must be trained in its use. Outof-town
and structural
should be aware of the
and posting
procedures. The forms should be easy to use and
structured in a fashion to be
with
data
to inform
owners and
tenants of their options. Procedures for
obtaining inventories and personal!Jellontgl11gs
from damaged buildings need to be developed.
The City emergency services director,
State
and FEMA rer1res•enta
need to understand their "'-'"""'""'"'
processes that consider the
local coordination between the business
rt<>vP:Inr•<>l1

coJnrrlunti~andgo,~nlm<ent

the
response team, and the
as a whole.
The
of donated resources
coordination locally, statewide,
and internationally.
tons of
resources arrive in a
struck by
disaster. Much of what is donated is not needed.
A system for
the actual needed
resources and for
and distributing
them is also needed. For
the
of
link between
California Cities has a
most cities in California. That network
(Ci~link) could be used to communicate
The
arriving at local
should be

to manage
the resources.
A better undez·standing
leaders best fit into disaster
is
are the elected leaders that should
a
role in recovery from a disaster.
Accurate and

coordination between code enforcement
~uuu;cu"'

owners and tenants is very ~uu~un
Written reconstruction process '"'""''-'U."'
streamlined

that do not constitute new construction
remodel. A coordinated effort between
'""''""ov" and church groups, trade
uu1v'o"'' and other
groups is necessary.
Public information and rumor control are
necessary after a disaster. Predisaster
relations between the emergenC"y broadcast
staff and
that
staff the

for visual review disaster
circumstances is
but without
or

formalize a
shelters.
The Red Cross and the
sites with
and Mass Care
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shelter managers, mutual
should be contracted.
In

and credibility. They also serve as role
models for children. Watsonville Recreation
assisting earthquake victims and
them to go to shelters rather than stay in makeshift tents without sanitation, etc.
Cities having significant minority
populations must actively solicit those
minorities to become involved as Red Cross
shelter volunteers, or on site or disaster
planning committees.
Cities should meet quarterly with human
service agencies that play roles in disaster
services management, including but not limited
to the Red Cross, food banks, health clinics,
county health departments, and utility
companies to share information on disaster
response and coordination.
"Unofficial" tent shelters are at best a
headache-at worst a nightmare. The Callaghan
Park "tent city" became a focal point of political
protest, a media focus and the distribution point
for dumped, donated commodities. Encouraged
by leaders who felt minority groups were left
out of the disaster service process, private tents
were set up at Callaghan Park. This lack of
inclusion was indeed a serious, ignorant
omission from Watsonville's planning process!
In-situ leadership evolved as services were
demanded by victims. Media attention fueled
the demands and encouraged entrenchment
rather than relocation to Red Cross shelters.
Victims insisted that they be allowed to remain

retJWSlDect, a
COUld have rm~,T<>nt'Prl
""'"·""~'"'"u Park incident. Local Red Cross
v1;~""""''"i<'u" must be aware of cultural and
ethnic diversity and study disasters in other
countries. Santa Cruz County Red Cross officials
were not aware of the
for use of tents
so they were reluctant to set up tents early on in
the disaster. Strategic placement of shelters at
schools and other sites central to neighborhood
areas may have prevented the ad hoc shelter
and the poor conditions that followed.
Plan for the sorting, storage and distribution
of donated clothing and household items for
earthquake victims. Limited occupancy
buildings may have a use for warehousing
supplies. Should another disaster occur in
Watsonville, Callaghan Park will serve as a focal
point for information, medical first aid, water
and food distribution under the auspices of the
City, Red Cross, a local health clinic, and other
social service agencies. Tents, if they need to be
erected, will be designated as under Red Cross
shelter services operations. Public service
announcements will direct those with donations
to receiving and distribution locations operated
by local community service groups.
The importance of local disaster service
providers meeting regularly cannot be
overstated. It is vitally important that these
groups meet, develop key contacts, identify each
agency's mission in the provision of disaster
services, and develop methods to identify and
coordinate key services. Groups representing
minority and special needs populations are
essential to the disaster planning process.
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